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PROCEDURAL PATH DEPENDENCE: 
DISCRIMINATION AND THE  
CIVIL-CRIMINAL DIVIDE 
JULIE C. SUK∗ 
ABSTRACT 
Procedural path dependence occurs when the particular features of the 
procedural system that is charged with enforcing a given legal norm 
determine the substantive path of that norm. This Article shows how the 
limits of employment discrimination law in two different national contexts 
can be explained by procedural dynamics. In France, as in several 
European countries, employment discrimination law is enforced 
predominantly in criminal proceedings. French criminal procedure 
enables the discovery of information necessary to prove the facts of 
discrimination, whereas the limits of French civil procedure make it 
impossible for such information to be revealed. As a result, the substantive 
legal norm of nondiscrimination is being developed in French criminal 
law, in which the element of intent and the defendant’s strong presumption 
of innocence are essential. In the United States, liberal civil procedure 
rules permit the broad discovery of information relevant to proving 
discrimination. At the same time, the civil litigation system has 
undermined the law’s adaptability to the evolving social practices that 
threaten equal employment opportunity. The civil dimension of this 
procedural system, deeply rooted in the paradigm of the private damages 
action, tends to favor the employment discrimination claims that most 
closely resemble torts, thereby limiting the law’s ability to address the 
complex causes of unequal employment opportunity. This, too, is an 
example of procedural path dependence. These examples reveal that 
discrimination is neither criminal nor civil in nature. To overcome its 
present limits, antidiscrimination law must transcend the substantive 
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principles that have become entrenched by the procedural systems in 
which it developed.  
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INTRODUCTION: THE CRIME OF DISCRIMINATION? 
Should employment discrimination be a crime? Most Americans would 
be shocked to hear that, in Paris, a marketing director for the cosmetics 
giant L’Oréal was recently sentenced to three months in prison for racial 
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discrimination in hiring.1 After all, U.S. law treats employment 
discrimination as a tortious injury for which the victim may be 
compensated through a civil suit. Accordingly, American legal 
professionals view discrimination as the kind of conduct that belongs in a 
civil liability regime.2 By contrast, French lawyers and policymakers tend 
to believe that discrimination is worthy of criminal punishment, and that 
civil sanctions alone would miss the point.3 And France is not alone. 
Several Western democratic legal systems impose criminal punishment for 
employment discrimination.4 What is the significance of these differences? 
This Article shows how, over time, a regulated behavior comes to be 
regarded by different legal systems as substantively criminal or civil in 
nature as a result of the procedural dynamics of enforcement. Procedure 
can strongly influence a legal culture’s continued perception of a social 
problem like discrimination as “civil” or “criminal.” These categories 
endure in the substantive conception of the legally prohibited conduct, and 
ultimately limit the legal system’s ability to regulate complex, evolving 
social problems. The limits of employment discrimination law exemplify 
what I call “procedural path dependence.” 
Almost all legal systems draw a sharp line between criminal and civil 
offenses.5 The primary goals of criminal and civil liability differ: The goal 
 
 
 1. Nathalie Brafman, L’Oréal et Adecco condamnées pour discrimination, LE MONDE, July 7, 
2007. The defendant was given a suspended sentence, since this was a first time offense. 
 2. In the United States, judges often characterize discrimination as a tort that is appropriately 
enforced through a private damages action. See, e.g., U.S. v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 254 (1992) 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195 (1974); Miller v. Bank of Am., 600 
F.2d 211, 213 (9th Cir. 1979); Patterson v. Am. Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 269 n.10 (4th Cir. 1976)); 
Pavlo v. Stiefel Labs., Inc., No. 78 Civ. 5551, 1979 WL 105, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 1979). 
 3. In France, lawyers and researchers continue to proclaim the importance of the symbolic value 
of criminal punishment for discrimination. See infra text accompanying notes 69–74; see also GROUPE 
D’ETUDE ET DE LUTTE CONTRE LES DISCRIMINATIONS [GELD], LE RECOURS AU DROIT DANS LA LUTTE 
CONTRE LES DISCRIMINATIONS: LA QUESTION DE LA PREUVE 22 (2000) [hereinafter GELD Report].  
 4. Several European Union countries impose criminal liability for acts associated with racism, 
including employment discrimination. See C. PÉN. art. 225-1, 225-2 (Fr.); Law on the Suppression of 
Certain Acts Prompted by Racism or Xenophobia of 30 July 1981 (Belg.), in LEGISLATING AGAINST 
DISCRIMINATION: AN INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF ANTI-DISCRIMINATION NORMS 116 (Nina Osin & 
Dina Porat eds., 2005) [hereinafter LEGISLATING AGAINST DISCRIMINATION]; SR art. 90quater (Neth.), 
in LEGISLATING AGAINST DISCRIMINATION 594; Penal Code ch. 11, art. 9 (Fin.), in LEGISLATING 
AGAINST DISCRIMINATION 303; L. 654, in Gazz. Uff. 1993, art. 3(1)(a) (Italy), in LEGISLATING 
AGAINST DISCRIMINATION 430; C. PÉN art. 454–57 (Lux.) in LEGISLATING AGAINST DISCRIMINATION 
505; C.P. art. 314 (Spain), in LEGISLATING AGAINST DISCRIMINATION 846; Penal Code art. 240 
(Port.), in LEGISLATING AGAINST DISCRIMINATION 654; Criminal Code art. 141 (Slovn.), in 
LEGISLATING AGAINST DISCRIMINATION 705.  
 5. See Paul H. Robinson, The Criminal-Civil Distinction and the Utility of Desert, 76 B.U. L. 
REV. 201, 201–02 n.1–14 (collecting sources detailing the civil-criminal distinctions in China, 
Switzerland, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Ireland, India, the former Soviet Union, Germany, Papua New 
Guinea, the Bedouin tribe, Singapore, Somalia, Thailand, Ukraine, and Ancient Rome). 
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of criminal law is to punish bad acts, whereas civil causes of action 
enforce the rights of private parties through compensation.6 The nature of 
the conduct punished by criminal law tends to be different from the 
conduct that is civilly compensated,7 such as tort. Criminal conduct tends 
to be widely regarded by the society as morally reprehensible, meaning 
that others have a moral right to be free from such conduct. Tortious 
conduct, by contrast, simply has social costs for which the actor ought to 
pay the price.8 Criminal law expresses public values more so than tort 
law.9 All of these differences underlie the justification for maintaining 
separate procedural regimes for criminal and civil liability that operate 
very differently with regard to information gathering, protection of 
defendants’ rights, and standards of proof.10 Applied to antidiscrimination 
law, it is tempting to assume that one nation’s enforcement by criminal 
process simply reflects the substantive conception of discrimination as 
morally wrong and worthy of punishment, whereas another nation’s 
enforcement by civil process reflects its substantive conception of 
discrimination as a private injury, like tort, for which compensation is the 
appropriate response. In short, the received wisdom is that substance 
justifies and therefore determines procedure. This assumption is a fixture 
in normative debates about how sharply the criminal-civil line should be 
drawn.11 
But little attention is paid to the reverse dynamic of procedure shaping 
substance. This Article shows how the evolution of a substantive legal 
 
 
 6. This view is reiterated in many scholarly treatments of the civil-criminal distinction. See, 
e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law Models—And 
What Can Be Done About It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875, 1878 (1992); Susan R. Klein, Redrawing the 
Criminal-Civil Boundary, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 679, 679–80 (1999); Robinson, supra note 5, at 204; 
Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the Criminal-Civil Procedural 
Divide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775, 785–86 (1997). This characterization of the difference between criminal and 
civil actions is also found in a leading French treatise on criminal law and procedure. See, e.g., 
GEORGES LEVASSEUR ET AL., DROIT PÉNAL GÉNÉRAL ET PROCÉDURE PÉNALE 124 (14th ed. 2002) 
(“The criminal action has for its purpose a punishment inflicted on the individual, proportionate to the 
fault he has committed . . . . the civil action has for its purpose compensation proportionate to the 
injury sustained.”) (“L’action publique a pour l’objet, une peine infligée à l’individu, proportionnée à 
la faute qu’il a commise . . . l’action civile a pour l’objet la réparation proportionnée au dommage 
subi.”). 
 7. Robinson, supra note 5, at 204. 
 8. See Coffee, supra note 6, at 1884. 
 9. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections on the 
Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 194 (1991). 
 10. The categories of “criminal” and “civil” are further differentiated in the United States in that 
the law of criminal procedure is largely constitutionalized while civil procedure is not. William J. 
Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 1 (1996). 
 11. See authors, supra notes 5–10. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss6/3
p 1315 Suk book pages.doc  5/23/2008 9:15:00 AM  
 
 
 
 
 
2008] PROCEDURAL PATH DEPENDENCE 1319 
 
 
 
 
norm can be stifled by the logic of the procedural system in which the 
norm is enforced. To shed light on this dynamic, this Article compares the 
influence of criminal procedure on definitions of discrimination in France 
with the influence of civil procedure on definitions of discrimination in the 
United States. In each system, there are informational advantages to 
enforcing discrimination law in one particular procedural regime. In 
France, the informational advantages of criminal procedure drive litigants 
to criminal courts, where intent to discriminate is necessary for a finding 
of liability. Even though French law authorizes civil liability, French 
employment discrimination law is being developed through a narrow 
criminal law paradigm due to the advantages of criminal procedure. 
Similarly, in the United States, the wealth of information available to 
litigants in civil discovery has kept employment discrimination 
exclusively in civil proceedings. This has unduly advantaged the cases that 
most closely resemble torts and kept new forms of discrimination beyond 
the reach of employment discrimination law. 
By comparing French criminal enforcement of employment 
discrimination law, on the one hand, and American civil enforcement of 
the same legal prohibition, on the other, this Article shows how a criminal 
enforcement regime in one national context can produce similar 
resistances to change as a civil enforcement regime in another national 
context. Both systems suffer from procedural path dependence, which 
occurs when the particular features of the procedural system which has 
been charged with enforcing a given legal norm determine the substantive 
path of that legal norm.  
The comparative analysis of antidiscrimination enforcement shows that 
discrimination, like many complex social problems, is neither inherently 
criminal nor civil in its substantive goals. Yet, it comes to appear 
substantively criminal or civil as a result of its procedural path. In 
destabilizing the criminal-civil distinction in employment discrimination 
law, this Article aims to encourage the development of regulatory 
approaches to complex social problems that combine features of both 
types of enforcement system. 
Part I describes the problem that the procedural path dependence theory 
seeks to illuminate: the inability of antidiscrimination law, in various legal 
systems, to effectively combat a myriad of social practices that cause 
unequal employment opportunity. Part II explains the concept of path 
dependence as developed by economists and political scientists and then 
applies this concept to procedural systems. Part III examines criminal 
liability for employment discrimination in France, arguing that the 
predominance of criminal enforcement can be traced to the informational 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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benefits of Continental criminal procedure as compared to Continental 
civil procedure. It also shows how, notwithstanding these benefits, 
criminal enforcement has limited the substantive scope of employment 
discrimination law. Part IV explores the effects of civil litigation on the 
American legal conceptualization of employment discrimination. It 
highlights the informational benefits of American civil procedure, and 
shows how some features of civil litigation have strengthened and 
reinforced the analogy between a private-law tort and employment 
discrimination, thereby limiting the law’s ability to regulate the complex 
forms that discrimination currently takes. Part V synthesizes the mutual 
lessons of the procedural path dependencies of French and U.S. 
employment discrimination law. It points out some remarkable similarities 
between the current limits that both systems face and argues in favor of 
rethinking and reorienting the public and private dimensions of this body 
of law. 
I. ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW’S LIMITS 
Much American employment discrimination scholarship has recently 
concluded that, while discrimination is pervasive in American society, 
antidiscrimination law is unable to combat most of its contemporary 
manifestations.12 Antidiscrimination law seems unable to get beyond the 
“most easily understood type of discrimination,”13 namely, intentional 
disparate treatment, motivated by animus, based on a prohibited 
characteristic. In the early days of Title VII, employment discrimination 
lawsuits were very effective in driving out the overt and intentional forms 
of racial discrimination practiced by employers.14 Prior to the passage of 
Title VII and the first wave of litigation, many employers explicitly 
excluded black workers or segregated job categories on the basis of race. 
Such overt forms of discrimination are rare today; yet the law seems 
unable to remedy any other form of discrimination. 
Scholars have documented the wide variety of discriminatory practices 
that persist today. Today, racial inequality in the workplace is rarely 
caused by acts stemming from racial animus. Rather, the most significant 
barriers to racial equality in employment are unconscious racism,15 
 
 
 12. See authors, infra notes 15–20. 
 13. See Int’l Bd. of Teamsters v. U.S., 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) (characterizing disparate 
treatment as the most easily understood type of discrimination). 
 14. John J. Donohue III & James Heckman, Continuous Versus Episodic Change: The Impact of 
Civil Rights Policy on the Economic Status of Blacks, 29 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1603, 1635–41 (1991). 
 15. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss6/3
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implicit bias,16 disparate impact discrimination,17 structural 
discrimination,18 and “second generation” employment discrimination.19 
Complex patterns of behavior, such as corporate culture, networking, and 
unconscious bias, tend to disadvantage racial minorities.20 These complex 
behaviors and dynamics seem to be beyond the radar of current 
antidiscrimination enforcement.21 A widely cited empirical study reveals 
that most employment discrimination cases allege individual disparate 
treatment, rather than class claims or disparate impact claims,22 even 
though many scholars suggest that structural and unintentional 
discrimination are greater barriers to equal employment opportunity.23 
Other studies establish that plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases 
lose more frequently than plaintiffs alleging other causes of action.24 
Employment discrimination cases are difficult to prove, especially since 
few cases turn up “smoking-gun” evidence of discrimination.25  
 
 
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1164 (1995). 
 16. See Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of 
“Affirmative Action,” 94 CAL. L. REV. 1063, 1072–73 (2006) (discussing implicit bias as cause of 
inequality). Christine Jolls notes that, even though antidiscrimination law may not directly remedy 
implicit bias, it may have the effect of decreasing implicit bias by increasing the presence of minorities 
in the workplace. See Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination Law’s Effect on Implicit Bias 2–3 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 343, 2005). 
 17. See Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 911, 919–20, 987–88 (2005). 
 18. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 
CAL. L. REV. 1, 2 (2006); Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a 
Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 91–92 (2003). 
 19. Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 458, 460–61 (2001). 
 20. See KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR 
THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 125 (2004). 
 21. As Christine Jolls and Cass Sunstein note, ordinary antidiscrimination law will often face 
grave difficulties in ferreting out implicit bias even when this bias produces unequal treatment.  
Of course, antidiscrimination law has long forbidden various forms of differential treatment 
on the basis of race and other protected traits. If, for example, a state official treats someone 
worse because of race, there might well be a violation of the Constitution as well as 
antidiscrimination statutes. Some of the hardest cases present problems of proof: if there is no 
“smoking gun,” how can bias be established? 
Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CAL. L. REV. 969, 976 (2006). See 
also Sturm, supra note 19, at 459. 
 22. John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment 
Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 998, 1020 (1991). 
 23. See supra notes 15–21. 
 24. See Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs 
Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 440 (2004); Wendy Parker, Lessons in 
Losing: Race Discrimination in Employment, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 889, 894 (2006); Michael 
Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard To Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 559–61 
(2001). 
 25. Federal courts have recognized that most disparate treatment plaintiffs must rely on the 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The limits of antidiscrimination law are even more pronounced in 
France. In France, a very small number of employment discrimination 
cases are litigated in court.26 Employers are rarely found liable without 
direct evidence of intent to discriminate.27 Even though statutes prohibit 
discrimination,28 including “indirect” or disparate impact discrimination, 
the law has not successfully remedied the widespread discrimination 
against North Africans in employment.29 The wave of riots by black and 
North African young people in the autumn of 2005 was widely understood 
as an angry reaction against discrimination, unemployment, and alienation 
from French society.30  
I have elsewhere defended the view that antidiscrimination law, 
properly understood, ought to remedy and regulate all employer practices 
that undermine equal employment opportunity, not only overt and 
intentional forms of discrimination.31 The purpose of this Article is not to 
reiterate that normative view. Rather, it is to illuminate some of the 
dynamics that contribute to antidiscrimination law’s present 
shortcomings.32 In what follows, I show how antidiscrimination law’s 
 
 
inferences that the factfinder can draw from circumstantial evidence since direct evidence of 
discriminatory intent is rarely discovered. See, e.g., Ryther v. KARE 11, 84 F.3d 1074, 1080 n.6 (8th 
Cir. 1996) (“[I]ntentional discrimination will frequently be proven by circumstantial evidence . . . .”) 
(citing U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983)); see also Hollander v. 
Am. Cyanamid Co., 895 F.2d 80, 85 (2d Cir. 1990) (“[E]mployers rarely leave a paper trail—or 
‘smoking gun’—attesting to a discriminatory intent . . . .”). 
 26. See BERNARD STASI, VERS LA HAUTE AUTORITE DE LUTTE CONTRE LES DISCRIMINATIONS 37 
(2003). 
 27. See infra Part III.F. 
 28. The principal antidiscrimination provisions are C. PÉN. art. 225-1 and 225-2 and C. TRAV. art. 
L. 122-45. See infra Part III.A & B. 
 29. Persons born in France to two North African parents have an unemployment rate of about 
20.1%, as compared to a national unemployment rate of about 10.2%. See Louis Maurin & Patrick 
Savidan, Données, in L’ETAT DES INEGALITES EN FRANCE 2007, 19, 96 tbl. (Louis Maurin & Patrick 
Savidan eds., 2006). Sociologists and NGOs have conducted various experiments that demonstrate that 
a CV bearing a North African name is significantly less likely to be selected for an interview by an 
employer, despite identical qualifications to a CV bearing a French name. See SAMUEL THOMAS, 
RAPPORT D’ANALYSE DES AFFAIRES RECENTES DE DISCRIMINATIONS A L’EMBAUCHE POURSUIVIES 
PAR SOS-RACISME 14 (2005); Jean-François Amadieu, Olivier, Gérard et Mohammed ont-ils les 
mêmes chances de faire carrière? Une analyse des enquêtes emploi de l’INSEE, April 2006, 
http://cergors.univ-paris1.fr.  
 30. See Fabien Jobard, Sociologie politique de la “racaille”, in ÉMEUTES URBAINES ET 
PROTESTATIONS: UNE SINGULARITE FRANÇAISE 59, 73 (Hugues Lagrange & Marco Oberti eds., 2006); 
Laurent Muchielli & Véronique le Goaziou, Inégalités, humiliations collectives et violences urbaines, 
in L’ETAT DES INEGALITES EN FRANCE 2007, 199, 201 (Louis Maurin & Patrick Savidan eds., 2006). 
 31. See Julie Chi-hye Suk, Antidiscrimination Law in the Administrative State, 2006 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 405 (arguing that antidiscrimination law is justified by principles of distributive justice, including 
the general societal duty to remove barriers to equal employment opportunity). 
 32. This article assumes that understanding the dynamics that cause these shortcomings can 
inform any future proposals for reform. Of course, for those who do not see the inability of 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss6/3
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resistance to change in two different legal systems exemplifies procedural 
path dependence. In other words, the current limits of antidiscrimination 
law are produced by the initial decision to categorize discrimination as 
“criminal” or “civil,” and the historical path of procedural advantages that 
reinforces those initial choices. 
II. PATH DEPENDENCE AND COMPARATIVE METHOD 
A. Path Dependence: Definition and Examples 
The concept of path dependence was developed by economists33 and 
political scientists,34 and has been particularly salient in the study of 
political behavior and political institutions. The concept can also 
illuminate law,35 including the behavior of legal actors and the evolution 
of legal institutions, in both the common-law and civil-law traditions. In 
short, path dependence occurs when a present outcome is shaped by the 
historical path leading up to it. 
Economists developed the idea of path dependence after noticing that 
economies and markets sometimes favored inefficient outcomes because 
these outcomes would become locked in by historical events. A concrete 
example, developed by Paul David and frequently discussed in the 
literature, is the predominance of the QWERTY keyboard on typewriters 
and computers.36 Despite the fact that many subsequent keyboard designs 
demonstrate increased efficiency (i.e., allowing a person to type twenty to 
forty percent faster, thereby lowering costs of using typists), the 
QWERTY typewriter keyboard remains dominant.37 David argues that the 
 
 
antidiscrimination law to address a wider variety of practices as a shortcoming worthy of reform, 
understanding these dynamics may appear less useful. 
 33. See W. Brian Arthur, Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by 
Historical Events, 99 ECON. J. 116 (1989); Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 
AM. ECON. REV. 332 (1985); S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-In, and 
History, 11 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 205 (1995). 
 34. See Margaret Levi, A Model, A Method, and a Map: Rational Choice in Comparative and 
Historical Analysis, in COMPARATIVE POLITICS: RATIONALITY, CULTURE AND STRUCTURE 19, 28 
(Mark Irving Lichbach & Alan S. Zuckerman eds., 1997); Paul Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path 
Dependence, and the Study of Politics, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 251 (2000). 
 35. See Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-In Effects in Law and Norms, 78 B.U. L. REV. 813 (1998); 
Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a 
Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601 (2001); Richard A. Posner, Past-Dependency, 
Pragmatism, and Critique of History in Adjudication and Legal Scholarship, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 573 
(2000). 
 36. See David, supra note 33, at 332; Arthur, supra note 33, at 126; Hathaway, supra note 35, at 
611; Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 33, at 213; see also Pierson, supra note 34, at 254. 
 37. David, supra note 33, at 332. 
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QWERTY keyboard got locked in because the dominance of the 
QWERTY keyboard at a particular historical moment led typists to learn 
how to type on that system, which then increased the costs of switching to 
another system.38 Thus, there were increasing returns associated with 
continuing to choose the QWERTY keyboard.39 
The idea of “increasing returns” is central to political scientists’ 
development of the path dependence concept. As Margaret Levi has noted, 
the costs of reversal in the arrangement of political institutions are high 
once a polity has started down a particular path.40 Paul Pierson suggests 
that political institutions have a “status quo bias” as compared with 
economic actors.41 The exit option, which is readily available in market 
transactions, is far more costly to those who feel poorly served by 
institutional arrangements.42 In fact, institutions are designed with 
durability in mind.  
The status quo bias is even stronger in legal institutions and rules. Law 
imposes binding constraints on behavior, with the goal of binding actors in 
the future.43 Indeed, the very concept of the rule of law depends on the 
value of predictability in law. In that sense, law is self-reinforcing. As 
Oona Hathaway has noted, the doctrine of stare decisis has made 
common-law systems explicitly and consciously path dependent.44 A 
system that is based on the binding authority of precedent by its very 
nature imposes costs every time it changes course;45 therefore, there are 
increasing returns to resisting change. Even in civil-law systems that have 
no formal doctrine of stare decisis, the values of predictability and 
legitimacy that underlie the strong positivist tradition of code systems 
impose costs on change. 
Path dependence explanations are contrasted in the political science 
literature with functional explanations.46 Functional arguments tend to 
explain political or legal outcomes as existing and persisting because they 
serve a particular function. Such arguments are prevalent among 
comparative political scientists as well as comparative legal scholars. Paul 
Pierson suggests that, while functional explanations may be a good way to 
 
 
 38. Id. at 335. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Levi, supra note 34, at 28. 
 41. Pierson, supra note 34, at 262. 
 42. Id. at 258. 
 43. Cf. id. at 262. 
 44. Hathaway, supra note 35, at 606. 
 45. Id. 
 46. E.g., Pierson, supra note 34, at 264. 
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derive causal hypotheses, they do not account for the possibility that “a 
dynamic of increasing returns may have locked in a particular option even 
though it originated by accident, or the factors that gave it an original 
advantage may have long since passed away.”47 By contrast, I shall show 
how functional explanations can shed light on path dependence in certain 
contexts. In other words, there may be a rational functional explanation for 
why a particular option originated rather than accident or happenstance. 
And there may exist additional factors that continue to make a present 
outcome desirable, at least in some respects. Yet, one can still explain the 
endurance of that present outcome as a form of path dependence if there 
are new, more complex factors that change and distort the workings of the 
factors that rendered the present state of affairs rational. 
B. Procedure and Antidiscrimination Enforcement 
In any national context, a procedural system may be selected to enforce 
the legal norm of nondiscrimination because, at the particular historical 
moment of choice, there is a fit between the substantive legal principles 
associated with that procedural system and the problems that constitute 
discrimination. Even when the substantive fit begins to erode, there remain 
certain practical conveniences in continuing to enforce the norm against 
discrimination through the existing procedural mechanism. There may be 
a good fit between the rules of procedure that govern information 
gathering and the discovery of information relevant to determining 
whether a norm articulated by antidiscrimination law has been violated. 
Yet, social practices evolve, and they evolve largely in response to the law 
itself. In the United States, for instance, the social practices that constitute 
“discrimination” have evolved since 1964 when Title VII was passed, in 
large part because the legal prohibition of discrimination has driven out 
the practices that were explicitly regarded as discriminatory when the 
statute was passed.48 As a result, the fact patterns that constitute a claim of 
discrimination may change. Over time, some of these fact patterns may be 
a poor fit with the principles, policies, norms, and practices that pervade a 
particular procedural system. 
 
 
 47. Id. at 264. 
 48. This dynamic is what Reva Siegel has called “preservation-through-transformation” in the 
context of equal protection. See Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving 
Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1113 (1997). 
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C. Comparative Method and Path Dependent Processes 
Comparative inquiry is an indispensable tool for shedding light on 
institutional arrangements that can be described as path dependent.49 
Because legal actors, including scholars, inhabit the institutional 
arrangements they seek to understand and critique, the path dependence of 
a particular feature of the institution may be difficult to identify.50 We tend 
to think there is something natural, perhaps even optimal, about the 
institutional arrangements of our own legal universe, including the 
particular arrangement in which we vindicate our universal human rights 
like equality. 
Encounters with foreign models destabilize this assumption in two 
important ways. First, foreign models, with their different institutional 
arrangements to address similar legal problems, are a reminder that our 
way is not the only way. Second, a critical perspective is often awakened 
and sharpened when the object of study is external to oneself. It is much 
easier to find fault with what is unfamiliar than with what is familiar. 
Thus, the hope is that understanding France’s procedural path dependence 
with regard to employment discrimination law will sharpen the analytical 
frameworks by which we re-evaluate the sources of resistance to change in 
U.S. antidiscrimination law. 
III. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION IN 
FRANCE 
A. Criminal Liability for Discrimination and its Origins 
In France, employment discrimination is a criminal offense. A person 
can face three years of imprisonment and €45,000 in criminal fines for 
firing or refusing to hire someone on the basis of race.51 It is also possible 
to enforce a legal prohibition of employment discrimination through a 
civil action by proceeding under a parallel provision of the Labor Code.52 
But most employment discrimination cases are litigated through criminal 
 
 
 49. As Robert Kagan puts it, comparative analysis attempts to reveal, inter alia, “unconsciously 
maintained patterns, and sources of resistance to change.” See ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL 
LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 5–6 (2001). 
 50. As John H. Langbein puts it, “[t]he purpose of comparative study is to help understand what 
is distinctive (and problematic) about domestic law.” John H. Langbein, The Influence of Comparative 
Procedure in the United States, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 545, 545 (1995). 
 51. C. PÉN. art. 225-2. 
 52. C. TRAV. art. L. 122-45. 
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rather than civil proceedings.53 This remains true six years after the 
passage of new laws implementing EU directives designed to make civil 
litigation of employment discrimination claims more friendly to potential 
plaintiffs.54 
An American will naturally wonder why and how France came to 
understand employment discrimination as a form of criminal activity. 
There is a historical explanation. When France first enacted employment 
discrimination laws in 1972, only a criminal provision was adopted, with 
the civil provision appearing ten years afterwards.55 Today, the main 
statutory provision against discrimination is found in Article 225-1 of the 
Penal Code,56 which originated with the codification of a 1972 anti-racism 
statute that prohibited, inter alia, racial discrimination.57 The main impetus 
for adopting a new statute in 1972 was to implement France’s obligations 
under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (ICERD).  
Why did France in 1972 choose to criminalize racial discrimination 
while other countries implementing ICERD, such as Great Britain, relied 
on civil and administrative sanctions?58 The legislative history of the 1972 
 
 
 53. See MARIE-THERESE LANQUETIN & MANUELA GREVY, PREMIER BILAN DE LA MISE EN 
OEUVRE DE LA LOI DU 16 NOVEMBRE 2001 RELATIVE A LA LATTE CONTRE LES DISCRIMINATIONS 77 
(2005) [hereinafter LANQUETIN & GREVY]. 
 54. See Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal 
treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, 2000 O.J. (L 180) 22; Law No. 2001-
1066 of Nov. 16, 2001, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], 
Nov. 17, 2001, p. 18311. 
 55. For a detailed treatment of the history of the 1972 anti-racism law and the politics of the 
memory of Vichy that influenced the antidiscrimination norm, see Julie Chi-hye Suk, Equal By 
Comparison: Unsettling Assumptions of Antidiscrimination Law, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 295 (2007). 
 56. The provision currently in force reads: 
Constitue une discrimination toute distinction opérée entre les personnes physiques à raison 
de leur origine, de leur sexe, de leur situation de famille, de leur grossesse, de leur apparence 
physique, de leur patronyme, de leur état de santé, de leur handicap, de leurs caractéristiques 
génétiques, de leurs moeurs, de leur orientation sexuelle, de leur âge, de leurs opinions 
politiques, de leurs activités syndicales, de leur appartenance ou de leur non-appartenance, 
vraie ou supposée, à une ethnie, une nation, une race ou une religion déterminée. 
Constitue également une discrimination toute distinction opérée entre les personnes morales à 
raison de l’origine, du sexe, de la situation de famille, de l’apparence physique, du 
patronyme, de l’état de santé, du handicap, des caractéristiques génétiques, des moeurs, de 
l’orientation sexuelle, de l’âge, des opinions politiques, des activités syndicales, de 
l’appartenance ou de la non-appartenance, vraie ou supposée, à une ethnie, une nation, une 
race ou une religion déterminée des membres ou de certains membres de ces personnes 
morales.  
C. PEN. art. 225-1 (Partie législative). 
 57. Law No. 72-546 of July 1, 1972, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official 
Gazette of France], July 2, 1972, p. 6803. 
 58. For a detailed account of Great Britain’s enforcement mechanisms for antidiscrimination law, 
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statute makes clear that the anti-racism law was building on an existing 
legal framework that already criminalized racist speech. The criminal 
prohibition of racial defamation in the press had first been adopted into 
French law in 1939 when anti-Semitic propaganda was on the rise.59 The 
Marchandeau law, as it was known, amended the 1881 free press law to 
prohibit “defamation and insults against a group of persons belonging by 
their origin to a particular race or religion, which have for their purpose to 
incite hatred against citizens or residents.”60 In 1972, when the law was 
adopted, controversies about France’s role in the Holocaust were at the 
forefront of public debate.61 
Because French employment discrimination law was part of French 
anti-racism law, which already had a history in criminal law dating back to 
the pre-Vichy regulation of anti-Semitism, employment discrimination law 
became a matter of criminal law.62 The memory of the world before and 
during Vichy was present in the discussion of the 1972 anti-racism bill.63 
The legislative debates reflect the understanding that discrimination in 
employment was not a new problem but was simply another manifestation 
of racism, which had been regulated in the past through criminal law. 
Thus, France’s pre-Vichy laws criminally punishing anti-Semitic speech 
provided the template on which its current antidiscrimination law was 
built. This set of historical contingencies enabled French employment 
discrimination law to be established as a criminal provision in the Penal 
Code. 
B. Civil Liability 
Ten years later, a new provision of the Labor Code also prohibited 
discrimination, making it possible for victims of employment 
discrimination to seek civil remedies before a Labor Tribunal. The 1982 
labor law, which generally protected the rights and liberties of employees 
in the workplace, included a ban on discrimination in matters of hiring, 
firing, disciplining, training, and promotion in the workplace, on the basis 
 
 
see Suk, supra note 31. 
 59. For a thorough account of the rise in anti-Semitic propaganda and the legitimatization of anti-
Semitic voices in French public discourse in the 1930s, see MICHAEL R. MARRUS & ROBERT O. 
PAXTON, VICHY FRANCE AND THE JEWS 34–71 (1981). 
 60. Decree of Apr. 21, 1939, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette 
of France], Apr. 25, 1939, p. 5295. 
 61. For a detailed account of these controversies, see Suk, supra note 55, at 312–15. 
 62. See id. at 312–13. 
 63. See Assemblée Nationale, Débats Parlementaires of June 7, 1972, Journal Officiel de la 
République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], June 8, 1972, at 2282. 
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of origin, race, sex, family situation, political opinions, union activities, or 
religious convictions.64 The antidiscrimination provision of this labor law 
was largely motivated by a 1976 European Council directive on equal 
treatment for men and women in employment.65 
The 1982 law provided that “[n]o employee can be punished or 
terminated because of his origin, sex, family situation, or membership in 
an ethnicity, nation, or race, political opinions, union membership, or 
religious convictions.”66 Punishing or sanctioning a worker was defined by 
the statute as “any measure, other than verbal observations, taken by the 
employer after an act of the employee considered by the employer to be 
faulty, whether or not the measure immediately affects the presence of the 
worker in the enterprise, his function, his career, or his pay.”67 Codified at 
Code du travail Article L. 122-45, the version of this provision currently 
in force protects both employees and job candidates from discrimination in 
recruitment, firing, and all other conditions of work, on the basis of origin, 
sex, morals, sexual orientation, age, family situation or pregnancy, genetic 
characteristics, membership or non-membership, real or supposed, in an 
ethnicity, nation, or race, political opinions, union activities, religious 
convictions, physical appearance, family name, state of health, or 
disability.68 
This statute, establishing a civil remedy for discriminatory firing and 
disciplining in the workplace, was part of a series of legal reforms that 
strengthened employee rights, particularly with regard to job security and 
the employee’s right to participation in the governance of the enterprise. 
The central thrust of the statute was the employee’s right to non-arbitrary 
treatment by the employer.69 Discrimination on the basis of race, sex, or 
union membership constituted arbitrary treatment and was thus not 
permitted. Thus, Code du travail Article L. 122-45 is a general employee 
rights provision to which the norm against racial or other group-based 
discrimination is incidental. This understanding of the provision is 
 
 
 64. Law No. 82-689 of Aug. 4, 1982, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official 
Gazette of France], Aug. 6, 1982, p. 2518. 
 65. Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 on the implementation of the principle of 
equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and 
promotion, and working conditions, 1976 O.J. (L 039) 40–42. 
 66. Law No. 82-689 of Aug. 4, 1982, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official 
Gazette of France], Aug. 6, 1982, p. 2519 (Section VI, Sous-section II). 
 67. Id. See also C. TRAV. art. L. 122-40. 
 68. C. TRAV. art. L. 122-45. 
 69. For an account of the discrimination provision in the context of the Labor Code’s general 
protections of employees, see Julie C. Suk, Discrimination at Will: Job Security Protections and Equal 
Employment Opportunity in Conflict, 60 STAN. L. REV. 73, 84–92 (2007). 
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reinforced by the fact that most litigation of this provision has not 
involved racial discrimination; it has involved complaints of 
discrimination on the basis of union membership.70 
Most of the developments with regard to civil liability for employment 
discrimination in France have occurred as a result of France’s attempt to 
implement European law. In November 2001, the French law on “the fight 
against discrimination”71 implemented the indirect discrimination and 
burden of proof provisions of the EU Race Directive. The statute 
prohibited discriminatory measures, whether “direct or indirect”72 in 
hiring, disciplining, firing, access to training, and various other conditions 
of employment. The statute also added the following language to Code du 
travail Article L. 122-45: 
In the case of litigation relative to the application of the preceding 
paragraphs, the concerned employee or candidate to recruitment, 
internship, or training period in the enterprise shall present elements 
of fact allowing the presumption of the existence of direct or 
indirect discrimination. In view of these elements, it shall fall upon 
the respondent to prove that the decision was justified by objective 
elements alien to all discrimination. The judge shall make a decision 
after having ordered, as necessary, all investigative measures that he 
deems useful.73 
According to this formulation, the employment discrimination plaintiff 
now only needs to present facts that raise an inference of discrimination. 
This showing then shifts the burden to the defendant to prove that there 
were nondiscriminatory “objective elements” that justified the challenged 
decision. Recent decisions by the Cour de cassation suggest that 
“presenting” facts under this statute requires more than merely alleging 
 
 
 70. The volume of union discrimination cases has only increased after the passage of the 2001 
statute, while the volume of race discrimination cases under this provision has not. See LANQUETIN & 
GREVY, supra note 53, at 28, 51. This is ironic in light of the fact that the 2001 statute was an 
implementation of the EU’s Race Directive. 
 71. Law No. 2001-1066 of Nov. 16, 2001, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] 
[Official Gazette of France], Nov. 17, 2001, p. 18311.  
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. Article 1 reads: 
En cas de litige relatif à l’application des alinéas précédents, le salarié concerné ou le candidat 
à un recrutement, à un stage ou à une période de formation en entreprise présente des 
éléments de fait laissant supposer l’existence d’une discrimination directe ou indirecte. Au vu 
de ces éléments, il incombe à la partie défenderesse de prouver que sa décision est justifiée 
par des éléments objectifs étrangers à toute discrimination. Le juge forme sa conviction après 
avoir ordonné, en cas de besoin, toutes les mesures d’instruction qu’il estime utiles. 
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these facts. The plaintiff must produce some evidence, albeit rebuttable 
evidence, that there is a disparity of treatment.74 
C. The Predominance of Criminal Employment Discrimination 
Proceedings 
In France, victims of discrimination typically begin legal action in 
either the criminal or civil courts with the assistance of anti-racist 
organizations, including, most prominently, SOS-Racisme. French 
criminal procedure allows victims of crimes to participate in criminal 
proceedings as civil parties.75 Furthermore, the Code de procédure pénale 
permits associations that have been committed to fighting against racism 
for at least five years to participate as civil parties in criminal prosecutions 
of racial discrimination.76 If a civil party participates in a criminal 
prosecution, it may make claims as part of the same proceeding for 
compensation. Victims can get compensation for injuries that result from 
criminal acts, and associations can obtain some part of the criminal fine, 
which compensates them for their participation. This feature of French 
criminal procedure, which has no analogue in U.S. law, gives victims and 
organizations like SOS-Racisme a meaningful choice between litigating 
racial employment discrimination77 in criminal and civil proceedings.78 
 
 
 74. C. TRAV. art. L. 122–45. See Cass. soc., May 18, 2006, No. 04-46498; Cass. soc., Aug. 3, 
2006, No. 04-44970. 
 75. C. PR. PÉN. art. 1. 
 76. C. PR. PÉN. art. 2-1 specifically provides: 
Every organization regularly committed, for at least five years before the date of the facts, by 
its statutes, to combating racism or to assisting victims of discrimination on the basis of their 
national, ethnic, racial, or religious origin, could exercise their rights recognized civil parties 
in matters concerning discrimination prohibited by articles 225-2 and 432-7 of the Penal 
Code. 
In recent employment discrimination litigation, SOS-Racisme has participated as a civil party in most 
of the cases that have been reported in the press. See, e.g., supra note 1. See generally THOMAS, supra 
note 29. Other organizations that have participated as civil parties include MRAP (Mouvement contre 
le racisme et pour l’aimitié et la paix) and LICRA (Ligue contre racisme et antisémitisme). See, e.g., 
infra note 91. 
 77. The Code Pénal’s prohibition of discrimination is not limited to race or origin. Indeed, it 
includes the same categories as physical appearance, state of health, handicap, political opinions, and 
union activities. See C. PÉN art. 225-1. Nonetheless, the Code de procédure pénale does not allow 
associations to participate as civil parties in all these types of prosecutions. The Code de procédure 
pénale allows anti-racist associations to participate in race discrimination prosecutions, and other 
provisions allow anti-sexist organizations to participate in sex discrimination prosecutions. See C. PR. 
PÉN. art 2–1, 2–2. 
 78. In the United States, victims who seek redress for criminal acts do not participate as parties in 
prosecutions; nor do criminal proceedings enable them to seek compensation for injuries caused by 
criminal acts. 
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Most legal action challenging racial discrimination in employment has 
been brought in criminal rather than civil proceedings.79 This has not 
changed despite the passage of the 2001 statute easing the plaintiff’s 
burden of proof in civil employment discrimination cases brought under 
Code du travail Article L. 122-45. Although the statute implemented the 
Race Directive, it has had no effect on the number of civil race 
discrimination complaints.80  
Although there are also civil cases that have been brought under the 
Labor Code’s antidiscrimination provision, few involve race or sex 
discrimination. The civil cases that have been brought under the Labor 
Code’s antidiscrimination provision have mostly involved challenges to 
discriminatory treatment on the basis of union membership.81 The violence 
in the Fall of 2005 by France’s second-generation immigrant population 
has brought attention to the widespread problem of racial discrimination in 
hiring, which is one explanation for the disproportionately high levels of 
unemployment amongst young people of North African origin.82 To the 
extent that French antidiscrimination law offers a remedy to the problem 
of racial discrimination in hiring, the remedies tend to be sought through 
criminal law and not through civil proceedings.83  
SOS-Racisme, the organization that most frequently participates as a 
partie civile in race discrimination cases, tends to choose criminal rather 
than civil proceedings. A March 2005 report of SOS-Racisme’s recent 
legal activities describes over twenty cases in which it has participated 
over the last five years, all of which were criminal cases.84 SOS-Racisme’s 
website, which offers advice to victims of discrimination, does not even 
mention the possibility of civil actions or civil liability. It simply instructs 
 
 
 79. See STASI, supra note 26, at 37. 
 80. L’arsenal juridique, LE MONDE, Mar. 31, 2004. 
 81. LANQUETIN & GREVY, supra note 53, at 31. 
 82. For a discussion of hiring discrimination and its relationship to France’s expansive job 
security protections, see Suk, supra note 69, at 95–100. 
 83. The Lanquetin and Grevy study notes that although Code du travail article L. 122-45 is 
normally litigated before the Conseils des prud’hommes (labor courts), racial discrimination in 
employment has seldom arisen in such proceedings because it was long assumed that the Conseils des 
prud’hommes can only hear cases arising from employment contracts, and racial discrimination in 
employment usually occurs prior to the formation of a contract—that is, in hiring. See LANQUETIN & 
GREVY, supra note 53, at 51. In December 2006, however, the Cour de cassation held that the Conseils 
des prud’hommes had jurisdiction over pre-contractual matters and could hear cases pertaining to 
access to employment and apprenticeships. Cass. soc., Dec. 20, 2006, Bull. civ. V, Nos. 06-40662, 06-
40799, & 06-40864. 
 84. See generally THOMAS, supra note 29. 
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victims to write directly to the prosecutor or to commence an investigation 
through the investigating magistrate’s office.85 
There is a widespread view amongst policymakers, activists, and 
academics that the nature of racial discrimination is inherently criminal. 
Racial discrimination cases are more often brought in criminal 
proceedings rather than civil proceedings because of the understanding 
that racial discrimination warrants the symbolic condemnation that only a 
criminal conviction can carry.86 A related argument is that criminal 
convictions are uniquely able to make an impact on public opinion through 
media publicity.87 SOS-Racisme made such arguments when it opposed 
the new provisions of the Equality of Opportunity Statute that authorize 
the HALDE to negotiate settlements with alleged discriminators. Such 
settlements would preclude the possibility of a criminal prosecution and 
conviction, thereby detracting from the purpose of publicly condemning 
those guilty of discrimination. Samuel Thomas, the vice president of SOS-
Racisme, argued that this provision was a real “step backwards”: “In 
giving the HALDE the possibility of imposing a simple financial sanction, 
even though discrimination is today a crime, punishable by a fine and the 
penalty of imprisonment, Parliament risks undermining the responsibility 
of the police and judges charged with enforcing the law. It is only by 
treating discriminators as delinquent that we can evolve behaviors and 
mentalities.”88 
The symbolic value of a criminal conviction derives from the public 
nature of a criminal proceeding. The victim is a civil party in what is 
essentially a prosecution by the republic against the discriminator—thus 
framing the crime of discrimination as a wrong to the entire republic. In 
the civil context, the wrong of discrimination is treated as a private injury 
to be compensated, and the fear is that this private law model will be 
reinforced by a settlement in which the victim is compensated while the 
perpetrator is never condemned. 
D. The Limits of Civil Procedure 
A close look at the realities of employment discrimination litigation in 
France and the United States reveals that racial discrimination is neither 
 
 
 85. See Discrimination à l’embauche, http://www.sos-racisme.org/?Discrimination&var_ 
recherche=l%27embauche (last visited Apr. 6, 2008). 
 86. See STASI, supra note 26, at 37. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Franck Seuret, Discriminations: le bâton de la Halde, L’ECONOMIE POLITIQUE, http://www. 
leconomiepolitique.fr/discrimations---le-baton-de-la-halde_fr_art_1999_23095.html. 
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inherently criminal nor inherently civil. Notwithstanding the social value 
of condemning and stigmatizing discrimination through criminal law, 
there are many other dynamics at work that tend to reinforce criminal 
law’s dominance in the employment discrimination area in France. These 
dynamics have little to do with the substantive fit between employment 
discrimination and criminal law. 
In reality, differences in civil and criminal procedure have made 
racially discriminatory hiring a problem of criminal law rather than 
employment law in France. John Langbein’s The German Advantage in 
Civil Procedure, a fixture in the canons of comparative law, famously 
praised the virtues of Continental civil procedure, including the lack of 
adversary-driven fact gathering in Continental systems of civil justice.89 
Yet, this feature of French civil procedure, coupled with the French norm 
of a passive investigatory role for judges in civil suits, make civil 
proceedings ill-suited for unearthing information relevant to claims of 
racial discrimination in hiring. The advantages of Continental criminal 
procedure as compared to Continental civil procedure have thus pushed all 
such cases into criminal law in France. 
To facilitate the comparison of French civil and criminal procedure in 
the employment discrimination context, it is useful to consider how a 
typical case would fare in each procedural system. As legislators debated 
the 2001 statute that eased the burden of proof, they often invoked the case 
of Raouf Lachhab,90 a man of Tunisian origin who had applied for a job at 
Crédit Mutuel (a French bank) in the Alsace region in response to an 
advertisement for the position. After he was rejected, he sent his CV again, 
only this time bearing the Alsacien name of Thierry Meyer rather than 
Raouf Lachhab. The second CV was in all other respects identical to the 
first, rejected CV. As Thierry Meyer, he obtained an interview for the 
job.91 Legislators invoked this case mainly as a rhetorical device to 
demonstrate the persistence of racial discrimination in hiring.92 Although 
legislators did not focus on the problem of procedure, the case provides a 
useful device for exposing the limits of civil procedure as compared to 
 
 
 89. See John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 
833, 841 (1985). For criticisms of Langbein’s argument, see Ronald J. Allen et al., The German 
Advantage in Civil Procedure: A Plea for More Details and Fewer Generalities in Comparative 
Scholarship, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 705 (1988); Samuel R. Gross, The American Advantage: The Value of 
Inefficient Litigation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 734 (1987). 
 90. M. PHILIPPE VUILQUE, ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE, REPORT NO. 2609, 5–6 (2000). 
 91. These facts were reported in Enquête. Une grande entreprise prise sur le fait de 
discrimination à l’embauche. L’HUMANITE, Feb. 4, 2000. 
 92. See VUILQUE, supra note 90, at 5–6. 
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criminal procedure in employment discrimination and also highlights how 
recent reforms do not necessarily fill in these gaps. 
Lachhab sent his CV bearing his own name several times before he 
received the response, “We regret that we are not able to respond 
favorably, since there is no vacant post that corresponds to your profile.”93 
Lachhab held a DEA (equivalent to master’s degree) in banking and 
finance. When he re-sent his own CV bearing the name Thierry Meyer, he 
received a message on his answering machine inviting him for an 
interview. Lachhab then filed a criminal complaint with prosecutors, 
accompanied by the anti-racist association LICRA (Ligue contre le 
racisme et l’antisémitisme) accompanying him as a partie civile.94 But 
Crédit Mutuel was not convicted.95 
To understand why persons similarly situated to Raouf Lachhab and 
associations like LICRA choose to bring criminal rather than civil 
proceedings, it is helpful to consider what would have happened if 
Lachhab had brought a proceeding under Code du travail Article L. 122-
45, governed by the Nouveau code de procédure civile (N.C.P.C.). Under 
the 1976 Nouveau code, a juge de la mise en état, an investigating 
magistrate, is in charge of the pretrial investigation of civil cases that are 
brought in the Tribunaux de grandes instances,96 courts of general 
jurisdiction. The Lachhab incident occurred prior to the adoption of the 
2001 statute. But even if the 2001 statute’s plaintiff-friendly burden-of-
proof provision had been in effect, it is clear that French civil procedure 
would still have made it difficult to prove Lachhab’s case. Other racially 
discriminatory hiring cases that have been criminally prosecuted in the last 
few years demonstrate the important role French criminal procedure plays 
in uncovering evidence of discrimination. 
The main problem that arises for plaintiffs claiming discriminatory 
hiring in the civil context is that parties cannot compel discovery of 
evidence in the adversary’s hands to acquire evidence that would prove the 
elements of one’s own case. In other words, bearing the burden of proof 
means bearing the burden of presenting evidence of the elements of one’s 
case. And, in stark contrast to litigants in the United States, a civil litigant 
does not have access to relevant evidence that is in the hands of the 
 
 
 93. Enquête, supra note 91. 
 94. See id. 
 95. See THOMAS, supra note 29, at 14. 
 96. N.C.P.C. art. 764. 
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adversary through the discovery devices that American lawyers rely on to 
get evidence that eventually supports one’s allegations at trial.97 
Several rules in the French Code of Civil Procedure, understood 
through the principles that underlie these rules, make it highly unusual for 
one party to obtain evidence from the adversary that will help establish its 
own case. Article 2 of the French Code of Civil Procedure provides that 
“The parties conduct the suit under the burdens they carry. It is up to them 
to accomplish the procedural acts in the forms and time frames 
required.”98 This article is understood to establish the party-driven nature 
of the proceedings, which is elaborated by Article 9, providing “The 
burden is on each party to prove, consistent with the law, the facts 
necessary to the success of its claim.”99 An equitable proceeding requires 
each party to prove, without the aid of the court or the other party, the 
facts upon which the claim depends.100 Some Americans assume that the 
civil law judge plays a central role in civil proceedings,101 largely because 
civil procedure rules do, in letter, authorize the judge to investigate facts. 
However, a strong norm of judicial neutrality emerges from the Code de 
procédure civile’s imposition of burdens on the parties, which in reality 
limits the judge’s liberty of investigation.102 
Even though the 2001 statute provides for burden shifting, the plaintiff 
must still “present” elements of fact that leave the factfinder to infer that 
discrimination occurred, and it is now clear that this requires the 
presentation of some evidence, not mere allegations. It is only after the 
plaintiff has submitted some evidence of such facts103 that the burden 
 
 
 97. See infra Part IV. 
 98. “Les parties conduisent l’instance sous les charges qui leur incombent. Il leur appartient 
d’accomplir les actes de la procédure dans les formes et délais requis.” N.C.P.C. art. 2. 
 99. “Il incombe à chaque partie de prouver conformément à la loi les faits nécessaires au succès 
de sa prétention.” N.C.P.C. art. 9. Anglo-American commentators have noted that that the role of the 
judge is also constrained by the requirement in N.C.P.C. art. 7 that the judge base his decision entirely 
on facts presented by the parties. See, e.g., C.N. Ngwasiri, The Role of the Judge in French Civil 
Proceedings, 9 CIVIL JUSTICE Q. 167, 177 (1990). 
 100. See Cass. 1e civ., Oct. 17, 2000, Bull. civ. I, No. 98-22046. 
 101. See KAGAN, supra note 49, at 105; Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery and the Role of the 
Judge in Civil Law Jurisdictions, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1017, 1021 (1998). 
 102. Traditionally, “the principle of neutrality of the judge remains at the basis of the French 
conception of the civil suit. Combined with the principle of formality of proof, it indubitably leads to 
the limitation of the judge’s liberty of investigation.” Claude Giverdon, The Problem of Proof in 
French Civil Law, 31 TUL. L. REV. 29, 37 (1956). This has not changed with the Nouveau code de 
procédure civile’s delegation of more power to the judge. Judges are frequently unwilling to compel 
production of evidence. See James Beardsley, Proof of Fact in French Civil Procedure, 34 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 459, 460–61 (1986). 
 103. See Catherine Minet, Présomption et preuve de la discrimination en droit du travail, JCP—La 
semaine juridique enterprise et affaires, May 22, 2003, at 894, 896. 
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shifts to the employer to prove that there was an objective 
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action.  
Practically speaking, the plaintiff has to present evidence of disparity in 
treatment. Without establishing that there was any disparity in the 
treatment of candidates belonging to one protected category and 
candidates belonging to another group, there would be no inference of 
discrimination. The evidence may be rebuttable, but nonetheless, it is the 
plaintiff’s duty to prove disparity in treatment.104 
Very often, reliable evidence of differential treatment correlated with 
one of the protected categories is difficult to find, especially for a job 
candidate who is an outsider to the enterprise in question. How does an 
outsider obtain evidence that the employer has granted interviews to 
candidates of a particular racial group? How does he obtain evidence that 
the employer is lying when he tells the candidate of color that the position 
is no longer vacant? French civil procedure has traditionally favored 
written proof of fact.105 But the documents that would tend to prove these 
allegations are often in the hands of the employer—for instance, personnel 
files or internal memoranda indicating which candidates were interviewed 
and which candidates were not. 
French civil procedure makes it very difficult to obtain documentary 
evidence that is in the hands of the adversary. Article 132 requires each 
party to disclose documents which support their own factual allegations.106 
A party can compel the disclosure of a document if the adversary is 
relying on it to prove a fact that the adversary alleges.107 Finally, the 
investigating judge is authorized to issue investigatory orders with regard 
to facts on which the resolution of the dispute depends if one party 
requests such an order.108 This power seems to encompass the judge’s 
power to require the production of documents by an employer that would 
tend to support the plaintiff’s factual allegation of disparate treatment, 
such as personnel or payroll records. But the judge’s power to order the 
production of documents is limited by Article 146, which provides “[i]n 
no case can an investigatory order be issued for the purpose of supplying 
the deficiency of a party in administering proof.”109 As a result, ordering a 
defendant to produce documents to support plaintiffs’ alleged facts, where 
 
 
 104. Id. at 895. 
 105. Beardsley, supra note 102, at 470. 
 106. N.C.P.C. art. 132. 
 107. See N.C.P.C. art. 142. 
 108. N.C.P.C. art. 142, 145. 
 109. “En aucun cas une mesure d’instruction ne peut être ordonnée en vue de suppléer la carence 
de la partie dans l’administration de la preuve.” N.C.P.C. art. 146. 
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plaintiff has no other evidence in his own possession to support these 
allegations, is seen as the judge’s attempt to supply plaintiff with helpful 
evidence for which plaintiff alone is responsible. Many decisions of the 
Cour de cassation have held such investigatory orders to be improper.110 
Raouf Lachhab, as a result of his double-CV experiment, may have 
some evidence of the employer’s disparate treatment of Alsaciens and 
Arabs: namely, his own testimony, oral or written, that he sent the two 
CVs, and was rejected first but invited for an interview under a new name. 
But under French rules of civil procedure, a party cannot be a witness in 
his own case.111 The judge does have the power, however, to issue an 
investigatory order requiring a party to appear for questioning before the 
judge. Still, such orders are subject to the limitation that the judge cannot 
use the investigatory orders to supply a party with missing evidence that 
the party bears the burden of presenting.112  
The 2001 statute, in addition to easing the burden of proof in 
employment discrimination cases, explicitly provides that “the judge shall 
form his conviction after having ordered, in case of need, all investigatory 
orders that he deems useful.”113 Although the statute encourages judges to 
issue investigatory orders when necessary in light of the burden-shifting 
framework introduced by the same statute, a recent empirical study of 
antidiscrimination litigation since the adoption of the 2001 statute reveals 
that investigatory orders in employment discrimination cases are almost 
nonexistent.114 Civil judges are accustomed to the norm of refraining from 
issuing investigatory orders when the orders appear to help one party fill 
in the deficiencies of proof for which that party bears the burden pursuant 
to Article 146. As a result, even though the 2001 statute reaffirms the 
judge’s discretion to issue orders he “deems useful,” civil judges are likely 
to exercise this discretion in very limited circumstances,115 in light of the 
 
 
 110. See Cass. soc., Dec. 18, 1978, Bull. civ., No. 77-40657; Cass. 1e civ., Nov. 4, 1982, Bull. civ. 
I, No. 81-15814; Cass. 1e civ., Feb. 4, 1981, Bull. civ. I, No. 79-12908. 
 111. N.C.P.C. art. 199 provides that the judge can take the testimony of third parties to shed light 
on the facts in dispute of which the witness has personal knowledge. Since 1959, the Cour de 
cassation has understood this to mean that a party cannot be a witness on his own behalf. Cass. 1e civ., 
Oct. 12, 1959, Bull. civ., No. 401. 
 112. N.C.P.C. art. 146. 
 113. C. TRAV. art. L. 122-45 (“Le juge forme sa conviction après avoir ordonné, en cas de besoin, 
toutes les mesures d’instruction qu’il estime utiles.”). 
 114. See LANQUETIN & GREVY, supra note 53, at 43. 
 115. As the country report commissioned by the European Commission’s European Community 
Action Programme to Combat Discrimination puts it: 
[Investigatory measure] is considered as an exceptional measure and it is conditional upon 
having already brought sufficient evidence before the Court. It is not in the legal culture of 
judicial actors, judges and lawyers, to use these procedural means of access to evidence, as 
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Code of Civil Procedure’s traditional understanding of the civil judge’s 
role. 
Another problem facing employment discrimination plaintiffs in civil 
proceedings is that certain forms of evidence have been deemed 
inadmissible by the Cour de cassation.116 For example, recordings that are 
made without the adverse party’s knowledge have been rendered illicit.117 
This makes it very hard to use the forms of evidence often relied upon by 
SOS-Racisme. SOS-Racisme and other anti-racist organizations often send 
actors of different races—black, Maghrébin, and white—into a given 
establishment, one at a time, each purporting to be applicants for an 
advertised job. SOS-Racisme plants witnesses posing as patrons of the 
establishment during these encounters. Sometimes, the employer will tell 
the candidate of color that the job is no longer open, even while telling the 
white candidate who comes in thereafter that the job is available. In some 
cases, the testers or witnesses bear recording devices. By contrast, 
plaintiffs in civil proceedings are not able to use recordings produced 
during testing operations to establish the facts they allege.118  
Article 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires each party to prove 
the facts necessary to the success of its claims “conformément à la loi,”119 
consistent with the law. Thus, if a plaintiff obtains a document through 
illegitimate means, for example by theft (which encompasses copying the 
employer’s documents without the employer’s consent), the evidence is 
inadmissible.120 Although courts have permitted employees to present 
copies of employer documents with which he is familiar through the 
exercise of his functions as employee,121 this exception is of no use to the 
job candidate complaining of discriminatory hiring. 
In addition to the difficulties imposed by civil procedure rules, 
substantive law prevents French plaintiffs from relying on a method of 
proof that American Title VII plaintiffs frequently use to establish racial 
disparities: statistics. In France, a 1978 law regulates data collection by 
 
 
the judge in civil matters is seen as not inquisitive and not taking part to the process leading 
to the introduction of evidence before the court. 
SOPHIE LATRAVERSE, EUROPEAN COMMISSION REPORT ON MEASURES TO COMBAT DISCRIMINATION: 
COUNTRY REPORT, FRANCE 59 (2007) [hereinafter COUNTRY REPORT, FRANCE], http://europa.eu.int/ 
comm/employment_social/fundamental_rights/policy/aneval/mon_en.htm. 
 116. GELD REPORT, supra note 3, at 45. 
 117. Cass. soc., Nov. 20, 1991, Bull. civ. V, No. 88-43120. 
 118. THOMAS, supra note 29, at 15–16. 
 119. N.C.P.C. art. 9. 
 120. See, e.g., Cass. crim., Jan. 8, 1979, Bull crim., No. 77-93038; Cass. crim., Dec. 8, 1998, Bull. 
crim., No. 97-83318. 
 121. Cass. soc., Dec. 2, 1998, Bull. civ. V, No. 96-44258. 
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prohibiting the mention in computerized and other databases of certain 
descriptors of persons. These descriptors include racial origins; political, 
philosophical, or religious opinions; and membership in associations and 
groups.122 Under the 1978 statute, it is illegal for the state and for 
employers to keep data classifying persons on the basis of race. This also 
makes it difficult for an employment discrimination plaintiff to establish 
the low percentages of racial minority employees in a given enterprise. 
E. Advantages of Criminal Procedure 
In contrast, many features of French criminal procedure make it easier 
for victims of discrimination to unearth the evidence from which disparate 
treatment may be inferred. Most importantly, the Code de procédure 
pénale construes a far more active role for the juge d’instruction, the judge 
investigating the crime, than the limited investigatory role of the civil 
judge under the Code de procédure civile. Furthermore, recordings made 
without the adversary’s knowledge are admissible in criminal proceedings, 
unlike in civil proceedings. In addition, the principle of the “liberté des 
preuves,”123 freedom of means of proof, makes it more common in 
criminal proceedings for witness testimony to be utilized. Finally, the 
possibility for victims and associations to participate in criminal 
proceedings as civil parties, with damages awarded upon a conviction, 
makes it efficient for plaintiffs to pursue remedies through criminal law. 
A victim of discrimination can file a complaint with the prosecutor, 
who then enlists a juge d’instruction, an investigating judge, to investigate 
the complaint. The juge d’instruction is strictly separate from the judge 
who hears the case at trial.124 The victim of discrimination can also go 
directly to the juge d’instruction. The rules of criminal procedure make 
investigation by the juge d’instruction mandatory for all crimes but 
discretionary for délits. Because discrimination is a délit, not all claims of 
discrimination require investigation. But if a victim goes directly to the 
 
 
 122. Law No. 78-17 of Jan. 6, 1978, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official 
Gazette of France], Jan. 7, 1978, p. 227. 
 123. The principle is embodied in C. PR. PÉN. art. 427, which provides that “Aside from the cases 
where the law provides otherwise, offenses may be established by any mode of proof, and the judge 
decides according to his inner conviction.” (“Hors les cas où la loi en dispose autrement, les 
infractions peuvent être établies par tout mode de preuve et le juge décide d’après son intime 
conviction.”) 
 124. C. PR. PÉN. art. 45. 
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juge d’instruction and files a complaint as a civil party, the judge will 
ordinarily initiate an investigation.125 
Article 81 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that the juge 
d’instruction is to proceed, consistent with the law, in all acts of 
investigation that he judges useful for the manifestation of truth. This duty 
is in stark contrast with the principles underlying the Code of Civil 
Procedure, which charges the parties with the primary duty of establishing 
the facts in dispute between them. The Code of Criminal Procedure also 
puts the search for truth at the center of the judge’s role, whereas the Code 
of Civil Procedure construes the judge’s role as facilitating the resolution 
of a dispute between equal private parties. 
Accordingly, the juge d’instruction has very broad powers to 
investigate, which she is obliged to utilize as she sees fit to discover the 
truth. She questions the accused, as well as witnesses, whom she can 
require to appear for questioning. She also has broad search and seizure 
power. Article 94 allows her to order searches of any place where objects 
may be discovered that will lead to the revelation of the truth.126 Although 
some documents cannot be discovered due to various forms of 
professional privilege, the judge can order the police to seize all non-
privileged documents that appear useful for the revelation of the truth. 
Thus, in an employment discrimination case, investigation by the juge 
d’instruction is very useful for uncovering evidence of both disparate 
treatment and discriminatory intent that is in the hands of the employer. In 
the cases that have resulted in findings of employer liability for 
discrimination, there is usually evidence, either documentary or 
testimonial, that could not have emerged in a civil proceeding. For 
instance, in 2002, the owner of “Hotel La Villa” was convicted of racial 
discrimination in hiring after an investigation uncovered the CVs of 
various applicants for a porter job that were marked “Black,”, or “Black, 
non, non!”127 In another case resulting in conviction of an Ikea recruiter, 
the investigation uncovered an e-mail memorandum concerning the 
 
 
 125. The first article of the Code de procédure pénale establishes that a civil party, a person who 
has been injured by a criminal act, can commence a criminal action. The Cour de cassation has 
understood this to mean that a complaint by a civil party to the juge d’instruction has the same effect 
as a prosecutor’s request to the juge d’instruction to begin investigation. See C. PR. PÉN. art. 1; Cass. 
crim. Dec. 8, 1906, Bull. crim. 
 126. C. PR. PÉN. art. 94 establishes that searches can be effectuated in any place where objects or 
computerized data can be discovered which would be useful to determining the truth. This standard is 
similar to the liberal “relevance” standard of FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b). 
 127. Tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I.] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, 17e ch. 
Nov. 14, 2002. 
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recruitment of employees responsible for the distribution of a catalogue. 
The e-mail stated, “For this type of work, do not recruit persons of color 
since it’s unfortunate to say that people open their doors to them less 
easily and it is important that we work quickly.”128 
In June 2006, a salon owner was convicted of racial discrimination 
after an investigation authorized by the juge d’instruction. The 
investigation consisted of oral interviews with the alleged victim, the 
defendant, and third-party witnesses. The alleged victim, a black woman, 
testified that she had appeared at the salon with her CV in response to a 
job advertisement she received from an employment agency, and that the 
salon owner said she was no longer looking for an employee.129 A friend 
of the victim, a white woman, testified she applied for the same job the 
next day, describing her qualifications as identical to those of the victim.130 
The salon owner offered her an interview for the job. The defendant salon 
owner admitted: “Yes, I refused her application because I was looking for 
a white employee because that corresponds better to the clientele.”131 
When asked why she thought a black hairdresser would harm the salon or 
its clients, the defendant answered, “I don’t know. I feel better with people 
of my color.” She was then asked, “Are you racist?” She replied, “No, not 
necessarily.”132 
Recently, the Paris Court of Appeals convicted the cosmetics giant 
L’Oréal, two of its subsidiaries, and temporary employment agencies, for 
racial discrimination in hiring, reversing a trial court’s acquittal.133 In that 
case, a criminal investigation revealed a document and testimony by 
witnesses that the company was searching for a woman of the “type 
BBR.” This expression, standing for “bleu, blanc, rouge,” the colors of the 
French flag, is commonly associated with the Front National, an openly 
anti-immigrant political party in France.134 The document came to light 
 
 
 128. “‘Pour ce type de travail, ne pas recruter de personnes de couleur car c’est malheureux à dire 
mais on leur ouvre moins facilement la porte et il s’agit d’avancer très vite. . . .’” Tribunal de grande 
instance [T.G.I.] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Versailles, 5e ch., Apr. 2, 2001, 8. 
 129. Procédure d’enquête préliminaire, Procès-verbal d’audition de personne gardée à vue No. 
00028/2006, Gendarmerie Nationale Chateaubriant, Jan. 3, 2006. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Procédure d’enquête préliminaire, Procès-verbal d’audition de personne gardée à vue No. 
00028/2006, Gendarmerie Nationale Chateaubriant, Feb. 14, 2006. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Note that French law recognizes no constitutional or statutory bar, such as double jeopardy or 
right to a jury trial, to allowing appellate courts to reverse acquittals. Appellate reversals may result in 
convictions (rather than new trials). 
 134. See Fête des Bleu Blanc Rouge 2005 avec Jean-Marie Le Pen, FRONT NATIONAL, 
http://www.frontnational.com/bbr/bbr.html; Le programme immigration, FRONT NATIONAL, 
http://www.frontnational.com/programmeimmigration.php.  
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because an employee of L’Oréal who had worked in recruitment had 
brought the matter to SOS-Racisme’s attention, which led to the filing of a 
criminal charge. The recruiter testified the company had specifically 
instructed her not to hire persons of color.135 Initially, the trial court 
acquitted all the defendants on the grounds that the proceeding had only 
presented “suppositions and approximations.”136 However, the Court of 
Appeals held that the facts constituted discrimination in hiring.137 
Furthermore, recordings made during testing operations are valid forms 
of evidence in criminal proceedings, in contrast to the civil context. The 
Cour de cassation has determined that recordings made without the 
knowledge of the employer do not constitute a crime of violating the 
private life of the employer. In that case, the recording consisted only of a 
telephone conversation discussing the possible firing of an employee and 
no private matters.138 Since criminal liability is not imposed for making 
such recordings, they can be used as evidence consistent with the rules of 
criminal procedure. 
The use of witness testimony of testing operations has been blessed by 
the Cour de cassation as a legitimate means of proving discrimination in 
violation of Code pénal Articles 225-1 and 2.139 Initially, some lower 
courts were excluding testimony by witnesses to testing operations 
organized by groups like SOS-Racisme on the grounds that allowing such 
testimony violated the defendant’s right to a fair defense and the 
presumption of innocence. Some judges dismissed the probative value of 
such witness testimony, particularly due to the lack of supervision by a 
police officer or bailiff. In a June 2002 decision, the Cour de cassation 
held that “[n]o legal provision permits criminal judges to dismiss methods 
of proof produced by the parties for the sole motive that they were 
obtained through an illicit or disloyal means.”140 Rather, the judges were 
instructed to consider the probative value of the testimony after having 
submitted it to an adversarial discussion.141 
As a result, testing operations and recordings have played an important 
role in highly publicized cases of discrimination that resulted in 
 
 
 135. Tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I.] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, June 1, 
2006, 7. 
 136. Id. at 10. 
 137. Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeals] Paris, 11e ch., July 6, 2007. 
 138. See, e.g., Cass. crim., Jan. 16, 1990, Bull. crim., No. 89-83075. 
 139. See Cass. crim., June 11, 2002, Bull. crim., No. 01-85559. 
 140. “[A]ucune disposition légale ne permet aux juges répressifs d’écarter les moyens de preuve 
produits par les parties au seul motif qu’ils auraient été obtenus de façon illicite ou déloyale.” Id. 
 141. Id. 
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convictions over the last few years. Most notably, in November 2002, 
Moulin Rouge, the famous Parisian nightclub, was convicted for 
discrimination in hiring, with a fine of €10,000.142 After Moulin Rouge 
had advertised a position for a host in the main cabaret hall, an 
employment agency recommended a young man of Senegalese origin, 
Abdoulaye Marega. A Moulin Rouge representative told the employment 
agency representative over the telephone “[w]e only hire people of color in 
the kitchen, not in the main hall.” To obtain proof, SOS-Racisme 
organized a testing operation in which two black men presented 
themselves, with hidden recording devices, as candidates for the position. 
They were told that they would not be hired because the job required 
fluency in both English and Spanish, a requirement that had not been 
included in the job description. After these events, the employment agency 
representative visited Moulin Rouge, asking for an explanation of these 
new requirements. This conversation was recorded by hidden camera, in 
which the Moulin Rouge representative said that they do not hire people of 
color in the main hall.143 
If a plaintiff in a civil proceeding presented such evidence to prove 
disparate treatment, it would not be admissible under Article 9 of the Code 
de procédure civile. But when the evidence was submitted to the 
prosecutor, the prosecutor referred the case for an investigation,144 during 
which it was confirmed that all of the persons of color employed by 
Moulin Rouge worked in the kitchen, not in the main hall. The Tribunal 
correctionnel de Paris convicted Moulin Rouge under Code pénal Articles 
225-1 and 225-2. In addition to the €10,000 fine imposed on Moulin 
Rouge, the nightclub was ordered to pay damages in the amount of €4,500 
to the victim and €2,300 to SOS-Racisme for its participation as partie 
civile.145 The Moulin Rouge personnel director who communicated the 
 
 
 142. Tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I.] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, Nov. 22, 
2002, cited in Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeals] Paris, 11e ch., Oct. 17, 2003. 
 143. Every major newspaper in Paris reported these events. See Ariane Chemin, Au Moulin-
Rouge, les Noirs sont priés de rester aux cuisines, LE MONDE, Oct. 6, 2002; Delphine Moreau, Le 
Moulin-Rouge comdamné pour discrimination raciale, LE FIGARO, Nov. 23–24, 2002; Claudine 
Proust, Le Moulin-Rouge accusé de racisme, LE PARISIEN, Oct. 4, 2002; Claudine Proust, Le Moulin 
rouge comdamné pour discrimination à l’embauche, LE PARISIEN, Dec. 23, 2002; Emmanuelle Reju, 
Le Moulin-Rouge ne voulait pas de serveur noir, LE JOURNAL DE LA CROIX, Oct. 4, 2002; Emilie Rive 
et al., Oct. 4, 2002. See also Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeals] Paris, 11e ch., Oct. 17, 
2003. 
 144. Claudine Proust, Le Moulin-Rouge accusé de racisme, LE PARISIEN, Oct. 4, 2002. 
 145. Delphine Moreau, Le Moulin-Rouge comdamné pour discrimination raciale, LE FIGARO, 
Nov. 23, 2002. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss6/3
p 1315 Suk book pages.doc  5/23/2008 9:15:00 AM  
 
 
 
 
 
2008] PROCEDURAL PATH DEPENDENCE 1345 
 
 
 
 
discriminatory preferences was also convicted and fined €3,000. These 
judgments were affirmed on appeal.146 
These examples highlight the ways in which criminal procedure 
enables persons who purport to be victims of discrimination to discover 
evidence confirming their assertions. In France, because anti-racist 
organizations have developed testing operations as their primary means of 
aiding persons claiming discrimination, the difficulty of using 
nonconsensual recordings as evidence in civil proceedings effectively 
excludes the only proof that a victim is likely to have. Establishing 
something as seemingly straightforward as the existence of disparate 
treatment of candidates of different races (whether motivated by racial 
animus or not) can be difficult without evidence from the testing 
operations. Because the job candidate cannot compel discovery of 
employer documents without first presenting some evidence of disparity, 
the difficulties of using testing evidence and the difficulties of obtaining 
employer documents are the main problems faced by employment 
discrimination plaintiffs in civil cases. Both of these problems are 
overcome by commencing criminal proceedings.147  
Furthermore, because victims can participate as civil parties to criminal 
proceedings and obtain damages through such proceedings, victims have 
little incentive to proceed in civil proceedings with the aid of a private 
attorney. Filing a criminal complaint that gives rise to a state-funded 
investigation is more cost-effective for victims of discrimination. As a 
result, racial discrimination in hiring is, for the most part, a matter of 
criminal law in France. 
F. The Persistence of Criminal Intent 
One consequence of concentrating discriminatory hiring cases in 
criminal proceedings is that criminal law’s emphasis on the element of 
intent shapes the legal concept of discrimination. Combined with the 
defendant’s presumption of innocence, it is very difficult for prosecutors 
to prove infractions of the criminal antidiscrimination provision, even 
when there is evidence of disparate treatment. As a result, even when 
personnel documents and testing operations unearth strong evidence of the 
disparate treatment, the burden is never on the employer to justify the 
 
 
 146. C.A. Paris, 11e ch., Oct. 17, 2003. 
 147. As the EU country report indicates, “The judicial tradition is to go to civil court with the 
element of evidence readily available to the party, which explains why plaintiffs often go to criminal 
court to obtain access to evidence.” See COUNTRY REPORT, FRANCE, supra note 115, at 59.  
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disparity with a nondiscriminatory reason. Rather, the prosecution carries 
the burden of showing that the disparate treatment is motivated by the 
discriminatory intent of the employer. This is crucial because it is a 
fundamental and general principle of the Code pénal that there is no crime 
or délit without the intention to commit it.148 
In criminal proceedings, the defendant benefits from the presumption 
of innocence. As a practical matter, this presumption functions to raise the 
prosecutor’s burden of proof. French criminal procedure does not employ 
different levels of standards of proof like the U.S. system. There is nothing 
like a “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard to be distinguished from the 
“preponderance of evidence” standard in civil cases.149 There is only one 
standard of proof for both civil and criminal proceedings: the “intime 
conviction” or “inner conviction” of the judge.150 Nonetheless, because the 
accused is presumed innocent, the prosecutor must prove the element of 
intent and cannot benefit from the burden-shifting framework that has 
been introduced into the civil liability regime, wherein simply establishing 
disparity of treatment between members of different groups could shift the 
burden to the employer to show that the disparity has a nondiscriminatory 
justification. 
It appears that all of the recent cases in which an employer has been 
found liable of discrimination have included clear, direct evidence of 
intent to discriminate on the basis of race or origin, the “smoking gun” in 
American parlance. In all the examples discussed, it was not merely 
evidence of disparity, that is, the failure to hire persons of color, that 
sufficed to find discrimination. There was always a document or testimony 
that clearly stated the intent of the defendant to exclude persons of color. 
Prosecutors tend not to attempt to prove discrimination without direct 
evidence of discriminatory intent that can be clearly attributed to an 
identifiable defendant.151 Thus, even when criminal proceedings are 
brought, the vast majority result in dismissal for insufficiency of 
evidence.152  
 
 
 148. C. PÉN. art. 121-3. 
 149. James Q. Whitman notes that the reasonable doubt rule, rooted in Christian theology, is 
unique to the Anglo-American world today. Continental systems have modernized their criminal 
procedure to facilitate factual proof by abandoning this standard of proof. See JAMES Q. WHITMAN, 
THE ORIGINS OF REASONABLE DOUBT: THEOLOGICAL ROOTS OF THE CRIMINAL TRIAL 20–25, 209–10 
(2008). 
 150. See C. PR. PÉN art. 427; Kevin Clermont & Emily Sherwin, A Comparative View of Standards 
of Proof, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 243, 251 (2002). 
 151. See GELD REPORT, supra note 3, at 19.  
 152. Although statistics of discrimination case dispositions are not systematically available, one 
interview with the Paris prosecutor in charge of the section that processes these cases revealed that, of 
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The 2001 law, in adopting a burden-shifting framework for 
circumstantial cases, explicitly reserved this framework for civil cases 
only.153 As employers and their human resources departments become 
more and more aware of the legal prohibition of discrimination, they will 
likely be more cautious to prevent traces of discriminatory intent, even if 
they do consciously exclude racial minorities when they hire. 
G. The Migration of the Intent Requirement Beyond Criminal Enforcement 
Because of the difficulty of proving discriminatory intent in criminal 
proceedings, there has been a move towards developing civil litigation of 
employment discrimination claims in France.154 In order to aid victims in 
assembling their dossiers of evidence for legal proceedings alleging 
discrimination, Parliament in December 2004 created a new independent 
administrative body dedicated to fighting discrimination and promoting 
equality: la Haute autorité de lutte contre les discriminations et pour 
l’égalité (High authority for the fight against discrimination and for 
equality) (HALDE).155  
Like the EEOC, the HALDE lacks the power of administrative 
sanction. Its main function is to process individual claims, facilitate 
conciliation,156 and to aid victims in gathering evidence157 for criminal or 
civil actions. The agency has limited investigatory powers. It can demand 
information from alleged discriminators, but must petition a judge to order 
compliance with these requests.158 If the HALDE concludes that the facts 
it uncovers constitute discrimination prohibited by the Penal Code, it is to 
inform the prosecutor. If a victim chooses to bring a civil proceeding, it 
may invite the HALDE to participate in the litigation by presenting its 
observations.159  
 
 
thirty-eight racial discrimination cases brought, twenty-eight had been disposed of, in which twenty-
four were dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. See Fabienne Goget, “Il est difficile de prouver une 
discrimination”: Parole contre parole, ça ne suffit pas, in GUIDE FRANCE INFO, DISCRIMINATIONS 
RACIALES, POUR EN FINIR 118 (Jean-Michel Blier & Solenn Royer eds., 2001).  
 153. Law No. 2001-1066 of Nov. 16, 2001, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] 
[Official Gazette of France], Nov. 17, 2001, p. 18311. 
 154. See, e.g., MOHAMMAD REBZANI, DES JUENES DANS LA DISCRIMINATION 128 (2002); 
VERONIQUE DE RUDDER, CHRISTIAN POIRET, FRANÇOIS VOURC’H, L’INEGALITE RACISTE: 
L’UNIVERSALITE REPUBLICAINE A L’EPREUVE 148–49 (2000); GELD REPORT, supra note 3, at 67.  
 155. Law No. 2004-1486 of Dec. 30, 2004, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] 
[Official Gazette of France], Dec. 31, 2004, p. 22567. 
 156. Id. art. 7. 
 157. Id. art. 4. 
 158. Id. art. 11. 
 159. Id. art. 12. 
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More recently, as part of the Equality of Opportunities statute passed in 
March 2006 as a response to the racial violence in France’s suburban 
ghettos, the HALDE’s powers were expanded. The agency is now 
authorized to negotiate settlements with alleged discriminators, but such 
settlements are limited to cases of intentional discrimination that could 
give rise to criminal sanctions. The statute provides that, if the HALDE 
concludes that the facts constitute discrimination in violation of the Penal 
Code provisions, the agency can offer the alleged violator a transaction by 
which the employer agrees to pay a fine, compensate the victim, or publish 
the fact of discrimination, in exchange for not being prosecuted.160 If the 
alleged discriminator rejects the transaction, the HALDE can then initiate 
a criminal prosecution. If the transaction is accepted, it must be submitted 
to the prosecutor and ratified by the court in the appropriate jurisdiction.161 
But the legislative design of the HALDE’s settlement power reflects 
the understanding that discrimination is predominantly intentional and 
criminal. The legislature did not delegate power to the HALDE to 
negotiate civil settlements. To the extent that the transaction power is seen 
as a form of enforcement power, it does not exist with regard to non-
criminal discrimination. For instance, the agency has no power to settle 
allegations of indirect discrimination. The settlement power is referred to 
as the “transaction pénale,” and the Code of Criminal Procedure was 
amended to codify this provision of the statute.162 One inference that can 
be drawn from the recent statute’s exclusion of civil discrimination claims 
from the HALDE’s settlement powers is that the very idea of 
discrimination is largely influenced by the criminal-law understanding that 
discrimination requires group-based animus or intent to discriminate. The 
criminal-law conception of discrimination influenced the way legislators 
approached the powers of the administrative agency. Ironically, even 
while the administrative authority was created, in part, as an attempt to 
overcome the limits and difficulties imposed by existing, largely criminal, 
enforcement mechanisms for antidiscrimination law, the definition of 
discrimination emanating from years of criminal enforcement has infected 
the delegation of powers to the administrative agency. 
Furthermore, judges in civil employment discrimination cases continue 
to look for proof of intent, perhaps as a proxy for fault,163 even when the 
 
 
 160. Law No. 2006-396 of Mar. 31, 2006, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] 
[Official Gazette of France], Apr. 2, 2006, p. 4950; COUNTRY REPORT, FRANCE, supra note 115, at 67. 
 161. EUROPEAN ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW REVIEW No. 4, 58 (2006). 
 162. C. PR. PEN. art. D 1-1. 
 163. The notion that fault is essential for civil liability endures in judicial attitudes towards civil 
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element of intent is not essential under the Labor Code’s 
antidiscrimination provision. There are very few civil cases challenging 
discrimination on the basis of origin (for reasons already discussed), but 
the following case is telling. Five plaintiffs of African and North African 
origin brought a case alleging that management gave differential 
evaluations of employees based on their origins and premised differential 
pay levels and access to promotion on these evaluations. The Labor 
Court—departing from typical practice—ordered the production of the 
employer’s records with regard to the status, remuneration, and promotion 
of the plaintiffs and other employees, and appointed an expert to analyze 
the data. 
The expert testified that there were differences in salary, status, and 
career development correlated with the origin of employees. The 
production of documents also turned up an internal memorandum detailing 
special programs that the employer provided for North African workers. 
These programs provided access to housing and assisted employees in 
returning to their native countries for retirement. The Labor Court 
ultimately rejected the plaintiffs’ claims of discrimination on the grounds 
that, while the evidence established disparate treatment of employees 
based on origin, the evidence did not support the inference that there was 
an intent to discriminate on the basis of origin.164 
It appears that the Labor Court applied an intent standard that 
corresponds to the criminal-law understanding of intent as racial animus, 
rather than merely the intent to treat people differently on the basis of their 
origin. This decision demonstrates the extent to which developing 
antidiscrimination law in criminal law can affect the substantive 
development of the concept of discrimination itself. As a result, even when 
the norm against discrimination is enforced through civil and 
administrative mechanisms, in which intent to commit the offending act 
need not be elements, the element of intent continues to matter 
nevertheless, thereby limiting the potential of new reforms. 
Thus, the French experience with employment discrimination law 
illustrates the theory of procedural path dependence. Criminal enforcement 
was chosen because it made sense within the political tradition of laws 
against racism in 1972. Over the next three decades, despite the adoption 
of a civil liability regime for discrimination, criminal enforcement also 
provided “increasing returns” in the form of informational benefits: 
 
 
employment discrimination cases. See COUNTRY REPORT, FRANCE, supra note 115, at 72. 
 164. Conseil des Prud’hommes [Labor Court] Boulogne, Dec. 12, 2005, in EUROPEAN ANTI-
DISCRIMINATION LAW REVIEW No. 3, 65–66 (2006). 
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criminal procedure was able to produce information essential to combating 
discrimination that civil procedure could not. Yet, a side effect of these 
increasing returns is the narrower definition of discrimination as a harm 
which requires discriminatory intent. This limited conception has affected 
the practice of civil enforcement, as well as the legislatively defined 
parameters of administrative enforcement power. 
IV. CIVIL LITIGATION OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
An analogous dynamic can be identified in the United States context. 
In this Part, I show how the procedural path dependence thesis can also 
explain the problems scholars have identified with the current state of 
employment discrimination law in the United States. Since Title VII was 
passed in 1964, the civil lawsuit has been the predominant means of 
enforcing the norm against employment discrimination. American rules of 
civil procedure, in contrast with the French system of civil procedure, 
make it relatively easy for plaintiffs to get access to information and 
evidence that would support factual allegations of discrimination. In short, 
civil actions provide informational benefits to employment discrimination 
plaintiffs. At the same time, other features of civil procedure and the civil 
justice system have led to some developments that ultimately distort the 
public and social goals of employment discrimination law. These 
dynamics, which I describe below, have reinforced the private-law tort 
paradigm of discrimination. The tort paradigm may appear more flexible 
than France’s criminal-law conception of discrimination. Yet, the tort 
analogy has reinforced the notion that discrimination is a dispute between 
private parties, thereby undermining the public dimension of the problem 
of unequal employment opportunity.  
A. The Origins of Private Enforcement of Title VII 
When Title VII was passed, most discrimination was intentional, and it 
consisted of employers’ identifiable acts of excluding or segregating 
blacks. Individual black job candidates and employees suffered 
identifiable injuries; they were not hired and they were segregated into less 
desirable and underpaid jobs. The intentional tort was a fitting analogy. A 
discriminatory practice, such as a refusal to hire blacks, was a wrongful act 
that directly caused a concrete injury to those not hired on account of 
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race.165 Thus, the legislators’ choice of a private civil cause of action by 
aggrieved parties as the primary mode of enforcement in 1964 makes 
sense, just as French legislators’ choice of criminal enforcement in 1972 
makes sense. 
But the notion that civil actions would be the main enforcement 
mechanism for Title VII was contested from the very beginning. The bill’s 
proponents envisioned the problem of discrimination as a broad public 
problem, not merely a private-law tort, that required enforcement by a 
strong administrative agency. When the bill was initially introduced in the 
House of Representatives, it delegated to the EEOC both rulemaking and 
enforcement powers,166 to be governed by the Administrative Procedure 
Act. It was designed to be analogous to the NLRB.167 The rulemaking 
authority would have permitted the agency to adopt civil rights policies 
directly, and the enforcement powers would have enabled the agency to 
issue cease-and-desist orders in adjudicatory proceedings. Yet, even before 
reaching the Senate, a compromise in the House stripped the EEOC of 
cease-and-desist powers.168 
As Daniel B. Rodriguez and Barry R. Weingast show, compromises in 
the Senate ultimately made the statute acceptable to Northern Republicans. 
In the Senate, the Mansfield-Dirksen Amendment further limited the 
EEOC’s power. First, it limited the rulemaking authority significantly,169 
allowing the EEOC to adopt rules only with regard to the procedures by 
which complaints can be made. The amendment also deprived the EEOC 
the power to bring lawsuits in federal court,170 a power which was later 
granted to the EEOC in 1972.171 Thus, under the 1964 Act, the EEOC 
would have to go through the Attorney General if it wanted to bring a 
lawsuit.172 Furthermore, the Attorney General could only bring lawsuits in 
“pattern and practice” cases, pursuant to another provision of the 
 
 
 165. John Gardner has likened intentional discrimination, as distinct from disparate impact or 
“indirect” discrimination, to the intentional tort. See John Gardner, Liberals and Unlawful 
Discrimination, 9 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 1 (1989). 
 166. HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL 
POLICY 98 (1990). 
 167. Id. at 133. 
 168. Id. at 189. 
 169. Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of Legislative 
History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Its Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 
1417, 1491–92 (2003). 
 170. GRAHAM, supra note 166, at 148. 
 171. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (2000). 
 172. See The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, § 705(g), 78 Stat. 241, (1964) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e). 
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Mansfield-Dirksen Amendment.173 The amendment also deleted the 
provision in the proposed bill that permitted groups like the NAACP to 
sue on behalf of an aggrieved worker.174 The EEOC’s role under the 
statute that ultimately passed was limited to investigating and conciliating 
individual claims of discrimination.175  
As a result, the only real mechanism for enforcement that remained 
was the civil lawsuit, to be brought by aggrieved individuals, or, in limited 
cases, the Attorney General.176 The EEOC’s main responsibility, as Hugh 
Davis Graham puts it, was “enforcing a private right to nondiscrimination 
by responding administrative to individual complaints,” as contrasted with 
the original vision of enforcing “the public’s interest in nondiscriminatory 
employment.”177 Favoring the private civil cause of action rather than a 
prosecutorial role for the EEOC was consistent with the private-law 
conception of discrimination that the Republicans favored. They insisted 
that the statute only prohibit intentional discrimination, and not 
“inadvertent” discrimination.178 They also sought reassurance that the 
statute did not require employers to achieve racial balance in the name of 
equal employment opportunity.179 In short, the compromise that permitted 
Title VII to become law180 reflected a limited substantive definition of 
discrimination as intentional acts of exclusion on the basis of the 
prohibited categories, which made the law fit substantively with torts and 
other private-law causes of action normally enforced through civil actions. 
B. Discovering Discrimination Under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure 
In the early days of Title VII, civil actions in federal courts facilitated 
the remedying of problems like employment discrimination. Perhaps to the 
dismay of those Senators who sought to blunt the effect of Title VII by 
stripping away the EEOC’s powers and leaving only the individual cause 
of action, civil actions brought under Title VII deterred the most blatant 
 
 
 173. Rodriguez & Weingast, supra note 169, at 1497. 
 174. Id. at 1471–72. 
 175. GRAHAM, supra note 166, at 189. 
 176. See The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, § 706(e), 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e). 
 177. GRAHAM, supra note 166, at 189 (emphasis in original). 
 178. Id. at 151. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Rodriguez and Weingast argue that the compromise is more pertinent to the interpretation of 
Title VII, rather than the intent of the original bill’s most avid supporters. See Rodriguez & Weingast, 
supra note 169, at 1422–24. 
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forms of discrimination.181 An important factor was that the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure developed in a way that facilitated the discovery of 
information relevant to allegations of discrimination. 
Particularly as compared to the French rules of civil procedure, the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure make it easy for plaintiffs to obtain 
crucial evidence that would support their claims. The Federal Rules 
established a liberal pleading standard for the plaintiff’s complaint. Once 
the complaint meets the standard adopted in Rule 8(a), which merely 
requires a “short and plain statement of the claim,”182 a plaintiff has access 
to discovery. The scope of discovery is also broad. Rule 26(b)(1) allows 
the parties to discover any matter that is relevant to a claim or defense.183 
Rules 30, 33, and 34 authorize parties to conduct depositions, serve each 
other with interrogatories which must be answered, and request documents 
from each other.184 Thus, as a matter of right, any plaintiff who meets the 
pleading standard can get access to documentary and oral evidence, if it 
exists, that supports the allegation of discrimination. This is in sharp 
contrast to the French rules of civil procedure. 
Furthermore, while criminal enforcement of employment 
discrimination law has never been attempted in the United States, one can 
only imagine how difficult it would be under American criminal procedure 
to prove the facts of discrimination. As William Stuntz has observed, 
criminal procedure, unlike civil procedure, is largely a matter of 
constitutional law in the United States.185 Carol Steiker has observed that, 
in criminal cases, the Constitution requires costly procedural protections 
for criminal defendants, including the protection against double jeopardy, 
the prohibition of ex post facto laws, the burden of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the free provision of legal counsel, the exclusion of 
unconstitutionally seized evidence, and a privilege against self-
incrimination.186 Thus, U.S. civil procedure likely makes it far easier for 
victims of discrimination to obtain information from employers as civil 
defendants than it would be for prosecutors to obtain information from 
employers if they were criminal defendants. 
 
 
 181. See John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment 
Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1015–16 (1991). 
 182. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). 
 183. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
 184. FED. R. CIV. P. 30, 33, 34. 
 185. Stuntz, supra note 10, at 1. 
 186. Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the Criminal-Civil 
Procedural Divide, 85 GEO. L. J. 775, 777–78 (1997). 
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The liberal approach to pleading and discovery was chosen in rejection 
of the more formal requirements of the common-law and code pleading 
systems that preceded the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
pleading standard became less stringent, and discovery broader, in the 
civil rights era. In a case that was initiated shortly after the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court held 
in Conley v. Gibson that class-action plaintiffs alleging employment 
discrimination by their union under the National Railway Act could meet 
their pleading burden as long as the complaint gave the defendant “fair 
notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it 
rests.”187 As Geoffrey Hazard has noted, Conley v. Gibson’s reading of 
Rule 8(a) was far broader than that applied by courts for twenty years 
prior. Lower courts understood a “short and plain statement” as requiring 
“a detailed narrative in ordinary language—one setting forth all elements 
of a claim under applicable substantive law.”188 
In Conley v. Gibson, the Court noted that the Federal Rules “do not 
require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his 
claim.”189 In order to have access to discovery, the plaintiff need not even 
allege (let alone prove) the specific facts upon which the claim is based. In 
the context of a class action employment discrimination complaint, the 
Court held that “a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a 
claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of 
claims which would entitle him to relief.”190 In that case, the plaintiffs had 
simply alleged that the union had refused to protect their jobs from 
wrongful discharge because they were Negroes. Although the defendants 
argued that the plaintiffs ought to have set forth specific facts to support 
the general allegations of discrimination in order to survive a motion to 
dismiss, the Supreme Court definitively rejected this understanding of 
Rule 8(a)’s pleading standard. 
Not only did the liberal pleading standard of Conley v. Gibson make it 
easier for plaintiffs to obtain access to discovery, but discovery itself was 
broadened shortly after the passage of Title VII. Developments in the 
 
 
 187. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 
127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007). Twombly narrowed the Conley v. Gibson pleading standard by rejecting the 
notion that plaintiff can survive a motion to dismiss unless there is no set of facts that would entitle 
him to relief. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1969. Nonetheless, Twombly did not reject Conley’s commitment 
to notice pleading. 
 188. Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr., From Whom No Secrets Are Hid, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1665, 1685 
(1998). 
 189. Conley, 355 U.S. at 48. 
 190. Id. at 45–46. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss6/3
p 1315 Suk book pages.doc  5/23/2008 9:15:00 AM  
 
 
 
 
 
2008] PROCEDURAL PATH DEPENDENCE 1355 
 
 
 
 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure throughout the 1960s generally 
facilitated public law litigation asserting constitutional or related claims.191 
As Richard Marcus has noted, the most important of these changes 
included a “discovery revolution.”192 By 1970, the Rules evolved so as to 
enable parties to direct interrogatories and document requests to all parties, 
schedule depositions by a simple notice, and subpoena witnesses who 
were not parties.193 In short, once a party met the pleading standard to get 
to discovery, parties had enormous latitude to gather information. 
Both the Supreme Court and lower courts have frequently invoked the 
Conley v. Gibson standard in civil rights cases, the paradigmatic cases 
engaging in “public law litigation” through civil actions.194 In the 1974 
case of Scheuer v. Rhodes, the Supreme Court cited Conley v. Gibson to 
support its reversal of a district court’s dismissal of § 1983 complaints in 
which the estates of deceased university students alleged that national 
guard officials had caused their deaths through illegal actions. In that case, 
the Supreme Court explicitly noted that the inquiry with regard to the 
sufficiency of the complaint was “whether the claimant is entitled to offer 
evidence to support the claims.”195 Thus, in this civil rights case, even if a 
recovery were “very remote and unlikely,”196 a plaintiff would still be 
entitled to discovery. The Court reaffirmed this liberal pleading standard 
in another civil rights case in 1994, also brought under § 1983. In 
Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination 
Unit, the Supreme Court rejected the Fifth Circuit’s application of a 
heightened pleading standard to § 1983 cases. Prior to that decision, some 
circuits required plaintiffs in cases alleging municipal liability to 
specifically allege factual details showing that the defendant was not 
immune from suit. Again, the Court cited Conley v. Gibson for the 
proposition that Rule 8(a)(2) does not require a claimant to set out in detail 
the facts upon which he bases his claim.197 
 
 
 191. See Richard L. Marcus, Malaise of the Litigation Superpower, in CIVIL JUSTICE IN CRISIS: 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 71, 86 (Adrian A.S. Zuckerman ed., 1999). 
 192. Id. at 87. 
 193. Id. 
 194. In the 1970s, scholars began to notice the possibility of using the civil action, which was 
traditionally a vehicle for dispute resolution between private parties, to achieve public reforms. See 
Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1283–84 
(1976); Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 29–31 (1979). 
 195. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other grounds by Davis v. 
Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984). 
 196. Id. 
 197. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 
168 (1994). 
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The Supreme Court also invoked Conley v. Gibson in 1976 in rejecting 
the argument that a Title VII complaint requires greater particularity.198 
This is significant because, in a Title VII case, a plaintiff can easily obtain 
access to evidence that is in the employer’s hands by generally alleging 
discrimination. With access to this evidence, the plaintiff can then 
construct a more coherent factual and legal theory of his case. The liberal 
approach to pleading and, by extension, access to discovery in Title VII 
cases has endured. In the 2002 case of Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, the 
Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit’s requirement that a Title VII 
plaintiff allege specific facts constituting a prima facie case under the 
McDonnell Douglas standard in order to survive a motion to dismiss.199 
The Supreme Court unanimously held, citing Conley, that an employment 
discrimination plaintiff need only give a statement that gives the defendant 
fair notice of the claim. The Court noted that, if direct evidence of 
discrimination were uncovered during discovery, the McDonnell Douglas 
burden-shifting framework would not be necessary since that framework 
was a way of establishing a circumstantial case of discrimination.200 The 
Court pointed out that “[b]efore discovery has unearthed relevant facts and 
evidence, it may be difficult to define the precise formulation of the 
required prima facie case in a particular case.”201 The Court explicitly 
noted that “[t]his simplified notice pleading standard relies on liberal 
discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define disputed facts 
and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims.”202 
Thus, the liberal approach to pleading under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, particularly as it has been applied to the civil rights and 
employment discrimination contexts,203 makes it possible for victims of 
discrimination to have access to discovery before specific facts giving rise 
to a claim of discrimination can be articulated. This is in stark contrast to 
French civil plaintiffs in discrimination cases, who must present some 
evidence of the facts they allege without being able to compel the 
 
 
 198. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 283 n.11 (1976). 
 199. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002). 
 200. Id. at 511–12. 
 201. Id. at 512. 
 202. Id. 
 203. After the Supreme Court’s decision this past Term in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, the endurance 
of the liberal pleading standard, particularly in the antitrust context, is in question. Although the Court 
did not overrule Swierkiewicz, it held, in reversing a lower court’s denial of a motion to dismiss a 
claim under the Sherman Antitrust Act, that dismissal for failure to state a claim does not require the 
appearance beyond a doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would 
entitle him to relief, explicitly rejecting the “no set of claims” language of Conley v. Gibson. See Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1969 (2007).  
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production of evidence in the employer’s possession. It is therefore 
obvious that, at least under the Supreme Court’s procedural framework, 
the civil action has informational benefits for those who seek to remedy 
employment discrimination. Filing a civil complaint, even one with very 
general allegations of discrimination, may be sufficient to survive a 
motion to dismiss, which then makes the legal mechanisms for the 
discovery of relevant evidence available to both parties as a matter of 
right. In short, the civil lawsuit allows the plaintiff to uncover the various 
acts and practices of the employer that may or may not support an 
inference of discrimination. Just as the French juge d’instruction in 
criminal proceedings can investigate the premises and documents of the 
employer to determine whether discrimination has occurred, private 
parties in the United States can investigate the premises and documents of 
the employer in civil proceedings to establish discrimination. 
In short, the same information that might be revealed during a criminal 
investigation in France can be revealed through civil discovery in the 
United States. And this is precisely why civil litigation has come to be 
seen as an appropriate way of enforcing public norms in the United States. 
As Jack Friedenthal put it in 1981, “developments in areas such as 
products liability, employment discrimination, and consumer protection 
have been the result at least partly of broad-ranging discovery 
provisions.”204 Friedenthal correctly observed that causes of action would 
not have expanded through court interpretation or legislative action if 
proof of harms to these norms were not normally available in civil 
litigation.205 
C. Consequences of Broad Discovery 
At first glance, the informational benefits of American civil procedure 
create “increasing returns” that make the continued use of civil litigation 
rational and desirable. Yet, a close look at key Supreme Court decisions 
raising plaintiffs’ evidentiary burdens in Title VII cases reveals a dynamic 
between the civil discovery regime and the narrowing of substantive 
doctrines of liability. The very availability of broad discovery has played 
an important justificatory role in narrowing employers’ liability. 
 
 
 204. Jack H. Friedenthal, A Divided Supreme Court Adopts Discovery Amendments to the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 69 CAL. L. REV. 806, 818 (1981). 
 205. Id. 
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Take, for instance, the 1981 case of Texas Department of Community 
Affairs v. Burdine.206 The Supreme Court held that, when the employee 
proves a prima facie case of disparate treatment under McDonnell 
Douglas, the employer only bears a burden of putting forth a 
nondiscriminatory reason for its action, rather than a burden of 
persuasion.207 Prior to this decision, some lower courts had assumed that 
the plaintiff’s establishment of a prima facie case raised an inference of 
discrimination and thus shifted the burden of persuasion to the 
defendant.208 The Supreme Court held, to the contrary, that in a Title VII 
case, the plaintiff always bears the burden of persuading the trier of fact 
that the defendant discriminated. This meant that the employer need only 
articulate—rather than prove—a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for 
its actions in order to rebut the inference of discrimination established by 
the plaintiff’s prima facie case.209 This holding made it more difficult for 
plaintiffs to prevail, by requiring plaintiffs to prove that the 
nondiscriminatory reason put forth was a pretext for discrimination. The 
Supreme Court insisted that this holding would not “unduly hinder the 
plaintiff”210 because “the liberal discovery rules applicable to any civil suit 
in federal court are supplemented in a Title VII suit by the plaintiff’s 
access to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s investigatory 
files concerning her complaint.”211 In light of the availability of liberal 
discovery, including access to EEOC files, the Burdine Court was 
“unpersuaded that the plaintiff will find it particularly difficult to prove 
that a proffered explanation lacking a factual basis is a pretext.”212 
Similarly, in Ward’s Cove Packing v. Atonio, the Supreme Court raised 
the disparate impact plaintiffs’ burden by requiring proof that a specific 
employer practice caused the statistical disparities between white and 
minority employees and job candidates.213 The plaintiffs had established 
that there had been a high percentage of nonwhite workers in the lower-
paid cannery jobs and a low percentage of nonwhite workers in the more 
desirable non-cannery jobs.214 The plaintiffs had also alleged that a variety 
 
 
 206. 450 U.S. 248 (1981). 
 207. Id. at 255. 
 208. Id. at 256–57. 
 209. Id. at 258. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. 490 U.S. 642, 657 (1989), superseded by statute on other grounds, Civil Rights Act of 1991, 
§ 105, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(k). 
 214. Id. at 650. 
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of employment practices, such as “nepotism, a rehire preference, a lack of 
objective hiring criteria, separate hiring channels, and a practice of not 
promoting from within” had caused the racial stratification.215 The 
Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs carried the burden of showing that 
“each challenged practice has a significantly disparate impact on 
employment opportunities for whites and nonwhites.”216 In short, it was 
not enough for the plaintiffs to establish a statistical disparity and to point 
to the allegedly problematic practices. Again, the Supreme Court invoked 
the availability of liberal civil discovery rules to support its rejection of the 
notion that the specific causation requirement would be “unduly 
burdensome on Title VII plaintiffs.”217 The Court noted that the “liberal 
civil discovery rules give plaintiffs broad access to employers’ records in 
an effort to document their claims.”218 Although the Civil Rights Act of 
1991 overruled Ward’s Cove in some respects, the plaintiff’s burden of 
showing that a “particular employment practice . . . causes a disparate 
impact”219 was actually codified, rather than abrogated, by the statute. 
Finally, another case which made it more difficult for plaintiffs to 
prevail, St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks,220 also demonstrates the 
synergies between liberal discovery and a narrower doctrine of employer 
liability. Hicks held that, in a disparate treatment case proceeding under 
the McDonnell Douglas framework, even if the trier of fact rejected the 
nondiscriminatory reason put forth by the employer as not worthy of 
credence, that rejection did not automatically entitle the plaintiff to 
judgment as a matter of law.221 Rather, the Hicks Court held that the 
plaintiff still carried the burden of persuading the factfinder that the real 
 
 
 215. Id. at 647. 
 216. Id. at 657. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105(a) (2006). 
 220. 509 U.S. 502 (1993). Many employment discrimination scholars criticized Hicks for 
increasing the burden on Title VII plaintiffs. See William R. Corbett, The “Fall” of Summers, the Rise 
of “Pretext Plus,” and the Escalating Subordination of Federal Employment Discrimination Law to 
Employment at Will: Lessons from McKennon and Hicks, 30 GA. L. REV. 305 (1996); Chad Derum & 
Karen Engle, The Rise of the Personal Animosity Presumption in Title VII and the Return to “No 
Cause” Employment, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1177 (2003); Cynthia L. Estlund, Wrongful Discharge 
Protections in an At-Will World, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1655 (1996); Deborah C. Malamud, The Last 
Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2229 (1995); Ann C. McGinley, 
Rethinking Civil Rights and Employment at Will: Toward a Coherent National Discharge Policy, 57 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1443 (1996). 
 221. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 507. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. holds that while a 
plaintiff is not necessarily entitled to judgment by showing that the employer’s nondiscriminatory 
reason is unworthy of credence, the trier of fact is permitted to infer discrimination from this showing. 
530 U.S. 133, 146–47 (2000). 
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motivation for the adverse employment action was intentional 
discrimination.222 
Although the Court did not explicitly invoke the liberal civil discovery 
rules to justify its holding in Hicks, it is clear that plaintiffs seeking to 
prove disparate treatment after Hicks require broader discovery. After 
Hicks, if an employer presents some evidence of a nondiscriminatory 
reason for the employment decision, the plaintiff must prove not only that 
the reason is unworthy of credence but also that the real reason for the 
decision was discrimination. Unless the plaintiff can uncover direct 
evidence of discriminatory motive in the form of a “smoking gun,” which 
is extremely rare, the plaintiff will likely depend on circumstantial 
evidence. Circumstantial evidence of discriminatory motive will often take 
the form of comparative evidence (such as documents and testimony about 
the performance and circumstances of other employees) and statistical 
evidence, both with regard to complaints of discrimination against the 
employer, and with regard to the employer’s general wage, salary, and 
promotion patterns over a period of time.223 If an employee has to show 
not only that the employer is lying, but also that the lying is motivated by 
discrimination, broader information about other employees as compared to 
the plaintiff becomes necessary for plaintiffs to carry their burdens of 
persuasion. 
D. The Overdetermined Tort Analogy 
The flexibility and breadth of American civil procedure rules made it 
possible for civil lawsuits to uncover a variety of employer practices that 
may disadvantage the groups protected by employment discrimination 
laws. Yet, these informational benefits, like the informational benefits of 
criminal enforcement in France, come with other consequences of civil 
litigation. The “civil” dimension of civil enforcement has not been lost. 
Civil litigation of employment discrimination claims in the United States 
has encouraged and entrenched the logic of tort law in employment 
discrimination cases. It is goes without saying in any tort case, for 
instance, that there is no cause of action in tort unless the plaintiff alleges 
an injury.224 These elements—injury in the form of adverse employment 
 
 
 222. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 507. 
 223. See Ann K. Hadrava, Note, The Amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) 
Scope of Discovery: An Empirical Analysis of Its Potential “Relevancy” to Employment 
Discrimination Actions, 26 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 1111, 1144–45 (2001). 
 224. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 VA. L. REV. 1625, 
1643–44 (2002). 
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action and causation of that injury by an identifiable act or omission by the 
defendant—are central to courts’ understanding of what constitutes 
employment discrimination under Title VII. 
When the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were promulgated in 1938, 
the private damages action was the paradigmatic case around which the 
rules were initially designed.225 Yet, as many scholars have shown,226 the 
current practices by employers that contribute most significantly to 
unequal employment opportunity are difficult to reform through this 
model of remediation. The enforcement of employment discrimination law 
has tremendous difficulty getting away from the tort paradigm, despite the 
distance between tort and the practices that undermine equal employment 
opportunity today. The persistence of the tort analogy explains several 
remarkable facts about the state of employment discrimination litigation 
today. 
First, the predominance of the logic of tort law explains why individual 
sexual harassment claims tend to be more successful than other 
employment discrimination claims. Sexual harassment claims are the 
employment discrimination claims that, today, look most like torts.227 In 
fact, these are the claims that can easily be joined with actual state-law tort 
claims, such as intentional infliction of emotional distress.228 Charles 
Sullivan has identified sexual harassment suits as an exception to his 
general observation that plaintiffs rarely win employment discrimination 
suits.229 Although the statistics are not perfect, Michael Selmi has 
calculated, based on numerous empirical studies, that employment 
discrimination plaintiffs have a win rate of about 35% in federal courts, as 
compared with 50% for plaintiffs in other causes of action.230 Yet, sexual 
harassment plaintiffs seem to fare better than other employment 
discrimination plaintiffs, as their win rates are closer to those for other 
 
 
 225. As Judith Resnik observes: 
[O]ne of the prototypical lawsuits for which the 1938 Federal Rules were designed was the 
relatively simple diversity case: a dispute between private individuals or businesses in which 
tortious injury or breach of contract was claimed, private attorneys were hired to represent the 
parties, and monetary damages were sought. 
Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 508 (1986). 
 226. See supra Part I. 
 227. Martha Chamallas, Discrimination and Outrage: The Migration from Civil Rights to Tort 
Law, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV., 2115, 2127 (2007). 
 228. Id. at 2118–19. 
 229. Sullivan, supra note 17, at 912 (“The state of employment discrimination practice can be 
easily summarized: plaintiffs are losing almost all of the cases they file except for a few isolated ones, 
most notably sexual harassment claims.”). 
 230. Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake? 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 739 
(2006). 
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causes of action. In an empirical study of sexual harassment suits in the 
federal courts in 1986–1995, Ann Juliano and Stewart J. Schwab note that 
sexual harassment plaintiffs tend to win 54% of cases decided on pretrial 
motions, 45.7% of bench trials, and 54.6% of jury trials.231 Plaintiffs’ win 
rates were increased in cases in which plaintiffs alleged physical contact 
(winning 55% of such cases), comments about physical appearance or of a 
sexual nature (winning 57% of such cases), or belittling or derogatory 
comments (winning 59% of such cases).232  
In short, Juliano and Schwab find that plaintiffs alleging “harassment 
as sexualized behavior”233 tend to be more successful than other sexual 
harassment victims. Plaintiffs who alleged harassment on comments of a 
sexual or physical nature were more successful than plaintiffs who alleged 
comments that devalued women as women. This suggests that courts tend 
to view sexual harassment through the lens of tort—individual harms to an 
individual’s dignity—rather than through the lens of equal employment 
opportunity regardless of sex. Identifiable conduct that looks like other 
torts, such as defamation or battery, tends to be more likely to lead to 
employer liability than conduct that might, over time, undermine women’s 
status in the workplace. 
Second, the persistence of the tort paradigm explains why disparate 
impact claims are seldom brought and seldom successful. John Donohue 
and Peter Siegelman’s 1991 study indicates that disparate impact cases 
had an extremely modest effect on employment discrimination litigation, 
finding, for instance, that the disparate impact theory only generated 101 
additional cases in 1989.234 Much recent scholarship notes that disparate 
impact claims remain rare relative to disparate treatment claims.235 This is 
in part because the 1991 Act authorized compensatory and punitive 
damages only for intentional discrimination claims, thereby decreasing 
attorneys’ incentives to bring disparate impact claims, in which intent is 
not an element. In so doing, the 1991 Act’s provision of these tort-like 
damages for tort-like (intentional wrongdoing) discrimination only 
reinforced the tort paradigm for employment discrimination. 
 
 
 231. Ann Juliano & Stewart J. Schwab, The Sweep of Sexual Harassment Cases, 86 CORNELL L. 
REV. 548, 570 (2001). 
 232. Id. at 571. 
 233. Juliano & Schwab, supra note 231, at 580. 
 234. Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 22, at 998. 
 235. See Melissa Hart, Disparate Impact Discrimination: The Limits of Litigation, the Possibilities 
for Internal Compliance, 33 J. COLLEGE & UNIV. L. 547, 549 (2007); Elaine W. Shoben, Disparate 
Impact Theory in Employment Discrimination: What’s Griggs Still Good For? What Not?, 42 
BRANDEIS L.J. 597, 598 (2004); Sullivan, supra note 17, at 913–14.  
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Michael Selmi’s recent empirical study of disparate impact cases, 
based on appellate cases in the LEXIS-NEXIS database, finds a declining 
success rate of disparate impact claims from 1984 to 2001, from fourteen 
out of twenty-five successful plaintiff claims in 1984–85 to two out of 
forty-three successful plaintiff claims in 1999–2001.236 The difficulty of 
winning a disparate impact claim can be attributed to the predominance of 
the tort paradigm that pervades the judicial framework of employment 
discrimination. Most fact patterns giving rise to this theory of liability do 
not fit neatly into a tort analogy. As Christine Jolls has noted, disparate 
impact cases often involve challenges to practices that disadvantage a 
group of people, rather than an individual injury.237 The disparate impact 
claim does not have a clear element of fault-based liability. Rather, the 
disparate impact theory seems to impose a duty of accommodation238: it 
requires employers not to engage in practices that disadvantage minorities, 
even practices that would be beneficial to their business operations, unless 
those practices are justified by business “necessity.” As a result, judges are 
resistant to this theory of liability. Samuel Bagenstos notes that, 
“[p]articularly in cases where it seems unlikely that the employer’s 
adoption of a practice with a disparate impact served as a cover for 
intentional discrimination, judges are hesitant to find liability under the 
disparate impact doctrine.”239 
Third, the persistence of the tort paradigm may explain why class 
actions are in decline in employment discrimination litigation. Although 
there were 1,174 class action employment discrimination cases filed in 
federal court in 1976, there were only seventy-three in 2000–01 and 2001–
02.240 One explanation is that courts are increasingly reluctant to certify 
classes, based on the belief that the named plaintiff is not “typical” of the 
other members of the class, as required under Rule 23(a),241 or that the 
common questions of law and fact do not predominate, as required to 
 
 
 236. Selmi, supra note 230, at 738. 
 237. See Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642, 671–72 
(2001). 
 238. See id. at 653. 
 239. See Bagenstos, supra note 18, at 41. 
 240. See Melissa Hart, Will Employment Discrimination Class Actions Survive?, 37 AKRON L. 
REV. 813, 820 (2004). 
 241. In Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, the Supreme Court held that district courts must satisfy 
themselves that all the requirements of Rule 23(a), including typicality, are met before certifying a 
class. 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982). As a result, many lower courts have been strict about the typicality 
requirement. See, e.g., Griffin v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1476, 1486–87 (11th Cir. 1987); Sanchez v. City of 
Santa Ana, 936 F.2d 1027, 1035 (9th Cir. 1990). 
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certify a class under Rule 23(b)(3).242 Expressed in these terms, the 
reluctance to certify classes reflects the understanding that discrimination 
consists of individual facts and injuries that are increasingly harder to 
understand as structural problems that affect large numbers of employees. 
For some courts, this understanding has been reinforced by the 1991 Civil 
Rights Act’s authorization of compensatory and punitive damages for 
intentional discrimination. Because these damages would require 
individualized proof for each plaintiff, it becomes increasingly harder to 
conclude that the common questions “predominate” as is required for the 
certification of a damages class action.243 
Finally, the entrenchment of the tort model of discrimination is 
reflected in settlements that have resulted from the few large nationwide 
employment discrimination class actions in recent memory. As Michael 
Selmi has documented, settlements in these cases focus on monetary relief 
and produce little or no substantive change within corporations with 
regard to equal employment opportunity.244 One of the most famous 
settlements resulted from a class action against Texaco in which African 
American employees challenged the company’s discriminatory salary and 
promotion practices. The 1996 Texaco settlement of $140 million included 
$115 million in monetary relief for the plaintiffs and their attorneys, in 
addition to $35 million toward a diversity task force to improve the 
company’s employment policies.245 Selmi’s follow-up study of Texaco 
suggests that “[b]eyond the monetary relief awarded to the plaintiffs, 
which was substantial, it is difficult to conclude that Texaco has made 
much progress in reforming its culture.”246 The civil suit drives toward a 
focus on monetary relief, even when problems of structural discrimination 
are revealed by the litigation. 
 
 
 242. See Allison v. Citgo Petrol. Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 407–10 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 243. See id. at 418. For a discussion of this view, see Daniel F. Piar, The Uncertain Future of Title 
VII Class Actions After the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 2001 BYU L. REV. 305 (2001). 
 244. See Michael Selmi, The Price of Discrimination: The Nature of Class Action Employment 
Discrimination Litigation and Its Effects, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1249, 1250–51 (2003). Selmi’s article 
focuses on the Texaco settlement, the Home Depot settlement, and the Denny’s settlement, all of 
which included monetary and other forms of relief. 
 245. Id. at 1273–74. 
 246. Id. at 1280. 
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V. MUTUAL LESSONS 
A. Similarities of Criminal Enforcement in France and Civil Enforcement 
in the United States 
In many ways, the predominance of criminal enforcement of 
employment discrimination law in France appears to mark a stark contrast 
to the American system of enforcing the non-discrimination norm through 
civil litigation. Americans may be troubled by the image of the jailed 
discriminator—the L’Oréal recruiter behind bars. Indeed, in the L’Oréal 
case, the Paris Court of Appeals sentenced Thérèse Coulange, the author 
of the incriminating fax document, to three months in prison.247 At the 
same time, Coulange got a suspended sentence,248 making it highly 
unlikely that she will actually go to jail. Although courts have rarely 
imposed prison sentences (the maximum being three years) in 
discrimination cases, it remains to be seen whether lower courts will 
follow this Court of Appeals’ example in imposing such sentences in the 
future. For the moment, most defendants in such cases typically face fines 
rather than a real possibility of imprisonment.  
In the L’Oréal case, each of the three defendant companies were fined 
€30,000. The maximum statutory fine is €45,000. In the United States, 
pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, an employer can face 
compensatory and punitive damage awards of up to $300,000 per plaintiff, 
which makes it possible for companies to face damage awards far 
exceeding €45,000, especially in multiple-plaintiff and class-action 
suits.249 Nonetheless, in practice, a recent study of confidential settlements 
in employment discrimination cases in one district suggests that the 
median damage award in confidential settlements, which are increasingly 
the typical way in which employment discrimination plaintiffs are 
compensated (if they are compensated at all), is $54,651. That amount is 
almost identical to the maximum criminal penalty under the French 
employment discrimination statute and not much more than the criminal 
fine imposed in the recent L’Oréal case. 
Another similarity between the French and U.S. contexts is that the 
procedural systems in which employment discrimination law is enforced 
 
 
 247. Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeals] Paris, 11e ch., July 7, 2007, at 15. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Note that, if the plaintiff joins a state common-law tort claim to the Title VII claim, such as 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff can recover uncapped compensatory and 
punitive damages. See Chamallas, supra note 227, at 2118–19. 
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have contributed to the evolution of substantive law in ways that privilege 
intentional discrimination (over disparate impact) and impose a high 
evidentiary burden on the party seeking to prove the existence of 
discrimination. In France, the intent element of criminal law and the 
presumption of innocence in criminal procedure have led to the high 
evidentiary burden on prosecutors and civil parties accusing a defendant of 
discrimination. In the United States, the private-law logic of tort law has 
permeated employment discrimination cases in ways which emphasize 
wrongful (often intentional) acts, and the broad discovery in civil 
procedure have led courts to protect defendants by imposing high 
evidentiary burdens on employment discrimination plaintiffs. 
These dynamics raise doubts about whether the civil or criminal 
categories matter at all in employment discrimination law. Is there a 
difference between criminal fines in France and civil damage awards in 
the United States? The difference between criminal and civil enforcement 
in France and the United States must be understood in light of the broader 
differences between the criminal and civil categories in the two national 
legal contexts. In France, there is a broader tendency to criminalize 
socially undesirable behaviors that American jurisdictions would address 
through tort law. French criminal law provides for the punishment of 
various offenses by fine. Lesser offenses are labeled “délits” and 
“contraventions,” as distinct from “crimes.” As James Q. Whitman has 
noted, this terminology is in reality a form of decriminalization: “A person 
convicted of something that is not ‘really’ a crime is a person who has not 
been stigmatized as ‘really’ a criminal.”250 Discrimination is a délit, and 
prison sentences are very rare, or suspended, as in the L’Oréal case. Other 
examples of délits that resemble American torts, punished mainly by fine, 
include the violation of privacy, including recording or transmitting an 
image of a person without that person’s consent,251 libel,252 and breaches 
of professional privilege.253 In all such cases, since victims of these acts 
can participate as civil parties and obtain damages in the event of a 
conviction, the criminal proceeding is a combined public and private 
proceeding for the regulation and compensation of a wrongful act. 
By contrast, Continental legal systems represent an “activist” state, 
expressing the policies of the state. French criminal law regulates a variety 
 
 
 250. JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE 
BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE 83 (2003). 
 251. C. PÉN. art. 226-1. 
 252. C. PÉN. art. 226-10 
 253. C. PÉN. art. 226-13. 
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of private wrongs that have a public dimension. The differences between 
criminal and civil procedure, as demonstrated in the case of employment 
discrimination, have facilitated this development. The reverse, and equally 
peculiar phenomenon is found in the United States: The predominance of 
private causes of action to enforce public rights and to remedy public 
wrongs in U.S. law. In the United States, rules of civil procedure in both 
the federal and state systems favor liberal discovery, such that plaintiffs in 
private-law actions can immediately obtain access to evidence supporting 
their claims that they would never otherwise have access to without having 
filed a lawsuit. As a result, private law litigation has a very public 
dimension in the United States, and has been used since the 1960s to 
achieve various collective goals, including civil rights, the deterrence of 
pollution, fair lending practices, and the like.254 As Mirjan R. Damaška has 
noted, the Continental and American legal systems represent two different 
ideals of officialdom. The American style tends to be “reactive,” reflecting 
the understanding that the state has no interests apart from society, such 
that it has no rights that can be violated apart from the rights of private 
parties.255 The Continental style is “activist;” social problems are 
considered state problems.256 
Nonetheless, the similar difficulties encountered by both French and 
American enforcement of employment discrimination law call into 
question the assumption that discrimination is a form of conduct that fits 
comfortably in one category or the other. Discrimination, like many forms 
of conduct regulated by modern legal orders, is neither “criminal” nor 
“civil” in nature. It is a multifaceted, complex, and evolving set of social 
practices and has both criminal and civil dimensions. An act that is 
motivated by racial animus, whether or not it ultimately results in harm to 
a particular member of a racial minority, should be considered an injury to 
public values and thus fits with the public condemnatory nature of 
criminal law. When individuals suffer a concrete setback to their interests, 
or an injury resulting from disparate treatment due to a negligent or 
intentional act that is not motivated by racial animus, tort law may seem 
more appropriate. Finally, the forms of behavior that tend to disadvantage 
racial minorities today, such as implicit bias, structural discrimination, 
lack of access to networking, or lack of comfort in the corporate culture, 
fit neither the criminal nor tort paradigms.  
 
 
 254. See KAGAN, supra note 49, at 51.  
 255. See MIRJAN R. DAMAŠKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY: A COMPARATIVE 
APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS 73 (1986). 
 256. Id. at 81. 
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B. The Advantages of Public Enforcement 
Nonetheless, the relative differences between the two legal systems’ 
understandings of discrimination do highlight a significant blind spot in 
U.S. law’s understanding of discrimination. Notwithstanding the limits of 
French criminal enforcement discussed in Part III.F, criminal enforcement 
of the antidiscrimination norm does have one advantage over civil liability 
alone: It conceives of discrimination as a harm to the state and to that 
society’s public values rather than a dispute between private parties with 
competing legitimate interests. It condemns discrimination; it does not 
merely price it. 
Furthermore, criminal enforcement opens up the possibility of 
punishing discriminatory practices without the participation of an injured 
party. In several of the recent high-profile employment discrimination 
cases resulting in convictions, such as the Ikea case,257 the “Hotel La 
Villa,”258 and the L’Oréal case, no victim participated in the proceedings. 
In fact, in the Ikea case, the defendant argued (unsuccessfully) that there 
had been no discrimination, only attempted discrimination, because the 
message revealing the intent to discriminate had not necessarily resulted in 
the rejection of applicants of color at that point.259 Similarly, although the 
record in the L’Oréal case indicated that Asian, North African, and black 
candidates had been rejected,260 the injury to those candidates was 
insignificant in determining that the company had discriminated. In all 
these cases, the material element that had to be proven was the intent to 
discriminate, not the injury to a particular claimant.  
By contrast, in the United States, a case could not conceivably be 
commenced without an action by an allegedly injured party, who then 
controls the investigation and prosecution of the claim. Without an 
allegation by a party of direct economic harm, there is no cause of action 
under Title VII.261 In the three French cases mentioned above, the cases 
were commenced when employees who had witnessed the discriminatory 
practices, rather than the victims of discrimination, had complained to 
 
 
 257. See discussion at supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
 258. See discussion at supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
 259. Tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I.] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Versailles, Apr. 
2, 2001, 15. 
 260. Cour d’Appel [CA] [regional court of appeals] Paris, July 6, 2007, 8. 
 261. For scholarly discussions of “actionable effects on the terms and conditions of employment, 
see Theresa M. Beiner, Do Reindeer Games Count as Terms, Conditions, or Privileges of Employment 
Under Title VII? 37 B.C. L. REV. 643, 656–63 (1996); Rebecca Hanner White, De Minimis 
Discrimination, 47 EMORY L. J. 1121, 1142–47 (1998). 
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SOS-Racisme or to the police. The Labor Code explicitly protects 
employees from being fired or disciplined for having witnessed or 
participated in legal actions against discrimination.262 
In short, the enforcement of the norm against discrimination without 
the participation of an actual injured party opens up possibilities that do 
not exist in the United States for regulating discriminatory practices. Most 
of the criminal prosecutions in France challenge discriminatory failures to 
hire. It is not necessary for persons who were not hired to participate in 
cases that result in the imposition of fines for discriminatory hiring 
practices. In the United States, hiring discrimination cases are rare. 
Although hiring cases outnumbered termination charges by fifty percent in 
the mid-1960s, they have since constituted a smaller and smaller 
proportion of the docket.263 Since 1991, hiring cases constitute less than 
twenty percent of Title VII litigation.264  
Yet, hiring discrimination persists in the United States. In the U.S. 
labor market, African Americans tend to be almost twice as likely as 
whites to be unemployed.265 While factors other than discrimination may 
also be at work, recent social science studies suggest that racial bias 
continues to play a significant role in producing these outcomes. A 2004 
study by economists at the University of Chicago establishes that 
employers respond differently to resumes bearing white-sounding names 
as compared to resumes bearing African-American-sounding names.266 
Another widely cited study shows that whites with criminal records are 
more likely to be interviewed than blacks without criminal records.267  
 
 
 262. See C. TRAV. art. L. 122–45 (“No employee can be disciplined, terminated, or made the 
object of a discriminatory measure for having witnessed the actions defined in the preceding 
paragraphs of this article.”); C. TRAV. art. L. 122-45-2 (“The termination of an employee is void if 
done following an action in justice engaged by the employee or in his or her favor based on the 
provisions of this code relative to discrimination, if it is established that the termination has no real or 
serious cause and constitutes in reality a measure taken by the employer because of the action in 
justice. In this case, the reintegration is the right of the employee and the employee is regarded as if 
s/he never stopped occupying her position.”) 
 263. Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 22, at 1015. 
 264. See Parker, supra note 24, at 944 (presenting national study of reported district court 
opinions on race discrimination cases, of which failure to hire constituted 3.9% of the cases in 2003). 
 265. The Labor Department’s statistics of January 2007 indicate an 8.2% unemployment rate for 
African Americans and 4.6% for whites. See Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Table 
A-2: Employment status of the civilian population by race, sex, and age, available at http://www.bls. 
gov/news.release/empsit.t02.htm. 
 266. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable than 
Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, Sept. 2004, http://gsb. 
uchicago.edu/pdf/bertrand.pdf. 
 267. Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 937, 958 (2003). 
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Despite the persistence of hiring discrimination, there are few 
incentives for persons who are not hired to bring lawsuits: Job candidates 
in a fluid labor market may eventually find jobs so as to minimize the 
payoff of backpay and compensatory damages for bringing such suits. 
Lawyers rationally prefer firing or failure-to-promote cases for the higher 
contingency fees that the higher damage awards can bring. The logic of 
civil liability, with its focus on compensable damages to plaintiffs, tends to 
devalue the hiring discrimination suit. Yet, this should not lead to the 
conclusion that hiring discrimination should be beyond the reach of 
employment discrimination law. Thus, a public enforcement regime has an 
important role to play in combating hiring discrimination. But because 
France’s criminal public enforcement regime is only effective in 
combating discriminatory acts that are accompanied by racist statements, 
France may not provide a model that is worth copying. Nonetheless, the 
French experience should inspire experimentation with public non-
criminal modes of enforcement to overcome the limited logic of civil 
liability.  
CONCLUSION: BEYOND CRIMINAL AND CIVIL 
The procedural path dependence analysis does not necessarily produce 
a particular solution to the problem of employment discrimination. It does, 
however, identify some dynamics that contribute significantly to 
antidiscrimination law’s current shortcomings. Comparing the American 
civil liability regime to the French criminal liability regime in this area of 
law enables us to see the extent to which substantive principles are 
embedded into the logic of each procedural system. These substantive 
principles both open up and restrict the possibilities for the substantive 
development of the antidiscrimination norm. Ultimately, the norm must 
evolve with the practices that threaten it.  
One goal of employment discrimination law that both France and the 
United States share in common is to combat unjustified differences in 
treatment between persons based on their group-based characteristics. 
These unjustified differences in treatment are manifested in a variety of 
employer practices. These practices evolve, and over time, they consist of 
actions that may resemble crimes, torts, or other undesirable behaviors that 
fit neither of these legal categories. Yet, the predominant enforcement 
mechanism in each society has entrenched narrow substantive conceptions 
of discrimination.  
To move beyond the perennial problem of procedural path dependence, 
the challenge for each society will be to preserve the strong articulation of 
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public norms that comes with criminal enforcement while allowing for the 
broader definition of discrimination that can only be legitimate outside of 
criminal enforcement. A regulatory approach to these practices, by 
administrative agencies268 or experimental self-regulation,269 may offer 
some hope. Regulation by administrative agencies, perhaps through 
administrative fines, does provide the possibility for combining the public 
dimension of criminal law with the greater flexibility in defining the 
substance of offending behaviors afforded by civil liability.270 But as of 
yet, the entrenched conceptions of discrimination have limited the legal 
framework in which both French and American equality agencies can 
operate, without the power to impose administrative sanctions. Thus, the 
future success of antidiscrimination reform in both countries requires 
greater flexibility than reliance on “criminal” or “civil” enforcement alone. 
 
 
 268. I have elsewhere argued that rulemaking and cease-and-desist powers should be delegated to 
the EEOC. See Julie Chi-hye Suk, Antidiscrimination Law in the Administrative State, 2006 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 405, 469–73 . 
 269. Susan Sturm’s account suggests that companies respond to the rules adopted by courts by 
inventing their own governance frameworks for promoting equality. See Sturm, supra note 19, at 522–
25. For a discussion of this emerging approach to employment discrimination, see Orly Lobel, The 
Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 
MINN. L. REV. 342, 419–27 (2005). 
 270. Kenneth Mann argues that the administrative state is capable of “hybrid” sanctioning by 
imposing fines intended to deter through the administrative rather than criminal process. See Kenneth 
Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 
1795, 1850–51 (1992). 
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